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Abstract
This thesis consists of two essays covering topics in the economics of financial institutions with an
emphasis on certain types of potential agency problems. In particular, it investigates two radically
different types of "arbs": arbitrators and arbitrageurs. The first essay studies securities arbitration
to shed light on a relevant form of financial regulation that was previously unexplored empirically:
the self-regulation of financial markets. The second essay investigates the informable financing
channel in the context of arbitrageur fund-raising to develop a theory of the limits to arbitrage.
Further details of each essay are included below:
In Chapter 1, I investigate whether self-regulation in financial markets leads to greater industry
bias and expertise in enforcement. Using hand-collected data on securities arbitration disputes
from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), I document that pro-industry arbi-
trators are selected more often to arbitration panels than pro-investor ones (selection on bias) and
that experts are also selected more frequently to cases (selection on expertise). Moreover, both
patterns vary substantially across cases. Selection on bias is strongest when large brokerage firms
are sued and when cases are more important to firms while selection on expertise increases with
case complexity. This suggests that arbitrators are assigned to cases in ways that lead to higher
industry bias and expertise. To assess whether the NASD is responsible for these patterns, I ex-
amine the impact of a change in regulation that greatly reduced NASD control over the selection
of arbitrators. Following this change, the allocation of expertise to cases declined while selection
on bias increased. These findings suggest that the NASD is not responsible for selection on bias
but that it increases selection on expertise. Thus, concerns about favoritism at the NASD may be
misplaced and, more generally, self-regulation may increase expertise and even lower industry bias
in enforcement.
In Chapter 2 (joint work with Dimitris Papanikolaou), we proposes a theory for the limits to
arbitrage based on financial relationships between arbitrageurs and banks. Financially constrained
arbitrageurs may choose to seek additional financing from informable financiers (e.g., banks) who
are initially unaware of their strategy but can understand it if it is disclosed to them. However, a
hold-up problem arises because these banks cannot commit to provide capital and have the financial
technology to profit from the strategies themselves. Understanding this, arbitrageurs choose to keep
their strategies private and stay financially constrained. This limits their correction of mispricing
unless banks have sufficient reputational capital to commit not to expropriate the arbitrageur. Us-
ing the framework of stochastic repeated games, we show that this form of limited arbitrage arises
when mispricing is largest and becomes more substantial as the degree of competition between
banks intensifies and arbitrageur wealth increases. More generally, it is argued that this pattern of
"underinvestment" in the most profitable states is likely to occur in other settings where informable
finance plays a prominent role and intellectual property rights are difficult to enforce (e.g., in the
financing of innovation).
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Chapter 1
Self-Regulation and Enforcement in
Financial Markets: Evidence From
Investor-Broker Disputes at the
NASD
1.1 Introduction
The design and enforcement of financial regulation are important to the proper functioning of
financial markets. In the United States, these regulatory activities are overseen by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) but often delegated to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such
as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). Since SROs are owned and organized by securities firms, there are potential advantages
and disadvantages associated with their control over regulation. If SROs maximize the interests
of their member firms, they may underenforce rules violations. On the other hand, they also have
specialized industry knowledge and may face lower monitoring costs. Thus, self-regulation could be
associated with a trade-off between bias and expertise. Despite the prevalence of self-regulation in
financial markets, little empirical research has examined the desirability of this form of regulation.
This paper starts filling this gap by exploring the behavior of a specific self-regulatory organiza-
tion, the NASD, in the resolution of disputes between retail investors and securities brokers. Since
these disputes proceed in an arbitration forum run by the NASD and brokerage firms form the
majority of its members, this environment provides an opportunity to study the trade-off between
bias and expertise associated with self-regulation. This setting is particularly promising because
the entire range of possible enforcement outcomes is reported. More importantly, a recent rules
change introduced in 1998 reduced the NASD's control over the enforcement process. Using a
unique hand-collected database of arbitration cases, I provide evidence that is consistent with the
presence of expertise and industry bias in SRO enforcement. I then investigate whether the decline
in NASD control led to a drop in this expertise and industry favoritism. Overall, the findings are
consistent with a fall in expertise, but do not provide evidence that bias decreased. In fact, the
results suggest the opposite change: bias increases following the reduction in self-regulation.
Ideally, enforcement institutions should be designed to maximize accuracy in interpreting facts
(i.e., expertise) and minimize deviation from the social optimum when translating these facts into
decisions (i.e., bias).' However, because optimal punishments are not observed, it is not possible
to evaluate an enforcement mechanism on either of these dimensions using only data on the level
or variance of decisions. Instead, this paper examines the selection of arbitrators to cases. Using
observed arbitration decisions to classify arbitrators as more or less pro-industry, I look for bias
in enforcement by verifying whether relatively more pro-industry arbitrators are selected more
frequently than pro-investor ones. Likewise, I classify arbitrators on the basis of their professional
backgrounds and case experience and explore expertise in enforcement by asking whether relatively
more expert arbitrators are also selected more often to cases. These two arbitrator selection patterns
are referred to as selection on bias and selection on expertise, respectively.
Endogenous arbitrator selection illustrates a specific way that bias and expertise can arise in
enforcement. For instance, if some arbitrators are more pro-industry than others, an arbitrator
selection process that "favors" pro-industry arbitrators will induce average outcomes that benefit
the industry. The analysis of selection on bias and expertise in disputes between investors and bro-
kers is appropriate for two reasons. First, there is likely to be widespread arbitrator heterogeneity.
Variation along the pro-claimant/pro-respondent dimension has been documented in other judicial
'An optimal enforcement institution also minimizes enforcement costs (e.g., Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2000).
Since NASD case dockets do not contain sufficient information on these costs, I cannot explore this dimension in the
analysis. However, many observers have argued that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, like arbitration, have
lower enforcement costs than more formal ones, like courts.
forums (e.g., Kling, 2006; and Chang and Schoar, 2006) and should be even more pronounced in
securities arbitration where adjudicators have more discretion. Second, the NASD exercises control
over the arbitrator selection process. Namely, it manages the arbitrator pool and, prior to the rules
change, hand-picks lists of potential arbitrators sent to parties. After receiving these lists, investors
and brokers have limited discretion in selecting the final panel.2
In the first part of the analysis, I document general patterns in arbitrator selection and find
evidence of selection on bias and expertise even after controlling for an arbitrator's degree of
availability and the characteristics of other potential arbitrators. Moreover, these patterns vary
across case importance and complexity. Selection on bias is more pronounced in important cases:
when the respondent list includes a large brokerage firm or when requested compensatory damages
are large. Selection on bias is also greater when cases involve more complex financial instruments
and strategies. This is consistent with the allocation of pro-industry arbitrators being targeted to
cases that most benefit industry either because the returns to bias are larger (important cases)
or bias is more easily masked into decisions (complex cases). Meanwhile, the correlation between
arbitrator expertise and selection is strongest in complex cases which have a large number of
distinct allegations. This suggests that expertise is not only used but managed in a way to increase
the precision of enforcement. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that this pattern is
only associated with scarce forms of expertise, namely experience in cases with similar allegation
profiles, and not with more widely available expertise, such as being a lawyer or having experience
as a chairperson on arbitration panels.
However, since all parties (not just the NASD) are involved in selection, two distinct channels
can induce these patterns in selection on bias. While selection on bias is consistent with the
presence of industry favoritism within the NASD, an alternative hypothesis is that brokerage firms
do better in the arbitrator selection process because of other comparative advantages. For example,
brokerage firms have more experience in arbitration and in selecting arbitrators and have more
information about arbitrators. This latter view does not imply that SRO control of arbitration
leads to weaker enforcement. In the second and main part of the analysis, I attempt to separate
these two hypotheses by taking advantage of the 1998 rules change mentioned earlier. This change
2This selection procedure is quite different from judge trials because judges are usually randomly drawn from a
regional pool. With the exception of the NASD's role in selection, arbitrator selection shares common features with
the selection of jurists in jury trials (e.g., both parties to a dispute have a fixed number of peremptory strikes and
can issue challenges for cause).
only affected rules governing the arbitrator selection process and primarily removed the NASD's
discretion in picking lists of potential arbitrators to send to parties. Surprisingly, I find that
selection on bias increased and, in some specifications, only becomes statistically significant after
this reduction in NASD control over selection (though the change is not significant). While some of
this difference can be explained by time variation in case characteristics, point estimates of selection
on bias are always larger and significantly greater than zero following the rules change even after
accounting for observable variation in cases. This supports the hypothesis that other comparative
advantages are at least partially responsible for selection on bias and casts some doubt on the
widespread view that SROs lead to reduced enforcement. Moreover, selection on expertise declines
following this change. This is consistent with the view that the NASD actually helped improve the
allocation of expertise to arbitration cases and thus increased the precision of enforcement.
A potential concern in interpreting both parts of the analysis is the presence of unobservable
case quality and other omitted variables. In particular, due to the endogeneity of panel selec-
tion, proxies for pro-industry bias may be capturing unobservable aspects of arbitrator expertise.
Thus, the correlation between arbitrator bias and selection frequency may be spurious. To miti-
gate this concern, I use additional institutional features of securities arbitration to verify that the
pro-industry proxies reflect differences in opinion and judgement patterns across arbitrators. For
example, the NASD does not allow class action lawsuits or require the application of precedent.
This allows me to identify a subsample of cases that have similar quality, due to a common source
of wrongdoing, and are subject to rulings by different arbitrators. I find that the outcomes of these
cases are correlated with my measures of bias. I also look at open disagreement between members
of arbitration panels by analyzing dissent patterns and find that larger within tribunal dispersion in
the bias proxies predicts a higher likelihood of dissent. Other robustness checks are also presented
to address concerns like the misclassification of expertise. Overall, results do not seem to be driven
by the misclassification of either arbitrator bias or expertise.
Beyond serving as a unique laboratory to study self-regulation, dispute resolution between
investors and brokers is also relevant for financial markets because it substantially affects broker
incentives. Broker behavior is likely to have a real impact on investment because full-service brokers
are major providers of professional financial advice (e.g., ICI and SIA, 2005).3 While this delegation
3Given recent changes in public policy, this influence is expected to grow substantially. For example, the Pension
Protection Act (HR2830), which amends the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act (ERISA) by lowering the
to brokers can be desirable because of economies of scale in information production and monitoring
(e.g., Diamond, 1984) and investors' behavioral biases (e.g., Odean, 1999; and Barber and Odean,
2000), investors will only realize gains if brokers act in their interest. However, as described in
the Tully Commission Report (SEC, 1995), the prevalence of commissions-based compensation in
the industry encourages brokers to recommend excessive trading and overinvestment in proprietary
products. Thus, if enforcement is ineffective, the agency problem between investors and brokers
may be sufficiently severe that investors reduce their use of advice from brokerage firms.4 This
could lead to costly distortions in portfolio allocation, like limited stock market participation or
overinvestment in familiar assets, and other negative effects on financial markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature relating
to the design and enforcement of financial regulation. Section 3 provides a background on impor-
tant institutional characteristics including the change in arbitrator selection procedures. Section
4 introduces the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 documents general patterns in
arbitrator selection and section 6 uses the rules change to see whether the NASD is responsible for
these patterns. Section 7 contains a number of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Starting with Becker (1968), there is an extensive theoretical literature on enforcement as a means
of deterring inefficient behavior. Most relevant to the debate on self-regulation is the issue of who
should enforce rules. Much of the research into this question has centered on the choice of public
versus private enforcement.5 Focusing mainly on the incentives of enforcers, Becker and Stigler
legal liability of employers who hire outside advisors to provide investment advice to their 401(k) plan participants, is
expected to dramatically increase the provision of professional advice in the defined-contribution channel of retirement
investing (e.g., "Trolling for 401(k) Treasures" in Registered Representative Magazine, 11/01/05.). Another potential
policy change, that would have an even greater impact on the size of the market, is the privatization of Social Security.
4This concern is particularly relevant given recent criticisms of securities arbitration by investor groups and the me-
dia. See, e.g. "Walled Off From Justice?" in Business Week, 03/22/04; "Judging Wall Street" in Newsweek, 09/06/04;
"Rough Justice: Wall Street Panels for Settling Fights Draw Renewed Fire" in Wall Street Journal, 03/17/05; and "Is
This Game Already Over?" in The New York Times, 06/18/06. There have also been political hearings on securities
arbitration held by the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Financial Services (03/17/05) and the North
American Securities Administrators Association (07/20/04).
5Roughly, public enforcement is undertaken by government institutions while private enforcement is undertaken
by private parties. Since enforcement is a multi-stage process, most enforcement institutions are characterized as a
mixture of these two extreme organizational forms where investigations are privately triggered (e.g., by victims) and
undertaken by either private (e.g., lawyers) or public (e.g., regulators) parties, while decisions are made by a public
(e.g., regulator or judge) or private (e.g., self-regulator) enforcer. The existing literature generally focuses on public
vs. private involvement in the latter two stages of the enforcement process.
(1974) argued that private parties, compensated with the fines they collect, would implement opti-
mal enforcement and that the market for private enforcement would ensure low enforcement costs.
However, others have suggested that private enforcement has limitations that can lead to either
overenforcement (Landes and Posner, 1975) or underenforcement (Polinsky, 1980) and that public
enforcement can be favorable even if private enforcers have a cost advantage. Looking within pub-
lic enforcement, Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) explore adjudicator heterogeneity and argue
that the choice of enforcer reduces to a trade-off between adjudicators who are impartial but un-
motivated (judges) versus those who are biased but highly incentivized (regulators).6 More closely
related to this paper, DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (2005) explicitly focus on self-regulation
and argue that it may be preferred over direct government regulation because of SROs' relative
expertise in detecting rules violations even though this leads to sub-optimal levels of enforcement.7
Further, they advocate a hierarchical structure of self-regulation with government oversight because
it achieves cost-effective enforcement while also inducing SROs to increase enforcement in order to
avoid direct involvement by the government.8 ' 9
There is also a large empirical literature that explores the effects of legal rules restricting the
behavior of corporate insiders and financial intermediaries. Using cross-country variation in these
rules, research in law and finance highlights a strong positive correlation between laws protecting
minority shareholders (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; and 2002), mandating disclosure, and
facilitating private enforcement (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) and measures of
financial development such as equity market size, ownership concentration, and firm valuation.
Related work also studies variation in specific rules within a country to learn about the impact
of rules changes. For example, recent research has recognized that certain rules changes that
6Regulators are highly motivated but biased because they are more subject to political and career concerns.
However, the corollary that regulators gather and interpret more information than judges requires that the information
provided by other parties across these two regimes be the same. As pointed out by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999),
after taking the other parties' incentives into account, this may not be the case.
7 Low levels of enforcement are used by SROs to provide excessive moral hazard rents to member firms even though
compete to attract customers (see Pirrong (1995) for an alternative story based on customer heterogeneity). This
view that SROs exercise monopoly power to capture rents for their members can be interpreted as an extreme form
of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971).
8Similar trade-offs between expertise and bias have been discussed in other economic environments. For instance,
managing this trade-off has been mentioned as an important consideration in the choice between insiders and outsiders
in corporate boards (e.g., Raheja, 2005).
'Relatedly, the financial contracting literature has begun exploring what laws should be enforced given the charac-
teristics (expertise) of the enforcer (e.g., Ayotte and Yun, 2005) and how optimal contracting (provision of incentives)
responds to corruption at the enforcer-level (e.g., Bond, 2004).
stengthened mandatory disclosure had a differential impact across corporations and exploited this
to provide further evidence that mandatory disclosure increases firm value (e.g., Greenstone, Oyer
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006; and Hochberg, Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006). Like this
paper, Chang and Schoar (2006) look at variation across judges in the application of laws, but do
so in the context of bankruptcy and reorganization. However, their focus is quite different from
mine because they look at ex-post effects of more pro-debtor application of rules while this paper
documents how adjudicator selection and heterogeneity impact ex-ante effective rules (i.e., rules
after taking their enforcement into account).
Focusing on enforcement, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) also look at effective rules in financial
markets. In particular, they use cross-country panel data on insider trading laws and their enforce-
ment and find that the cost of capital in a country only falls after the first enforcement of these
laws rather than the date of their passing. This provides support for the intuition that a good law
requires good enforcement to have real impact. Bhattacharya, Galpin and Haslem (2006) study
corporate litigation and document that domestic firms fare better than international ones when
sued in U.S. federal courts. Their paper is similar to mine in that it looks at bias in enforcement.
However, my paper focuses on the disciplining of financial intermediaries which, most importantly,
sheds light on a common feature of the regulation of financial markets, self-regulation, because
enforcement falls under the control of SROs rather than the public. This paper also adds to the
empirical literature on arbitration, which has mainly looked at labor disputes (e.g., Ashenfelter
and Bloom, 1984; Bloom and Cavanagh, 1986; and Ashenfelter, 1987), by analyzing disputes in the
fastest growing segment of arbitration: commercial arbitration.
Regarding the securities brokerage industry, evidence on the link between conflicts of interest
and broker behavior is limited due to the unavailability of micro-data on most broker actions.
Recent work provides some suggestive evidence on this link using data on mutual fund flows that
is disaggregated by distribution channel. This research finds that broker-distributed funds charge
higher fees and perform worse than those that are distributed directly (Bergstresser, Chalmers and
Tufano, 2006) and, looking within this channel, that redemptions from funds using less conflicted
brokers (unaffiliated brokers) are more closely associated with poor future performance while those
from funds using more conflicted brokers (captive brokers) are more likely to be reallocated within
the same fund family (Christoffersen, Evans and Musto, 2006). Using more detailed data from the
real estate market, Levitt and Syverson (2006) also document self-interested behavior by real estate
brokers. Given further evidence of conflicts of interest and misbehavior in other financial services
(e.g., Christie and Schultz, 1994; Lin and McNichols, 1998; and Michaely and Womack, 1999),
it seems that managing broker incentives should be a priority for investors and policymakers.
This paper complements the emphasis on compensation-based incentives by exploring the other
component of incentive constraints: enforcement-based incentives.
This paper also contributes to the literature on frictions in portfolio choice by exploring an in-
stitutional component of retail investor trust in financial intermediaries. In particular, if investors
do not trust brokers in their role as financial advisors, they may respond by undertaking investment
more independently which can lead to distortions in portfolio allocation.10 For example, Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2006) provide evidence that investor concerns about being cheated in fi-
nancial markets lead to limited stock market participation. This is particularly likely in the case of
mistrust in financial advisors because of increased participation costs associated with researching
investments individually (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). Other systematic patterns of underdiversi-
fication by individual investors could also be partially explained by a lack of trust in brokers. These
include holding too few stocks in one's portfolio to save on information acquisition costs, domestic
and international home bias (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005;
Poterba and French, 1991; and Bailey, Kumar and Ng, 2005) and overconcentration of portfolios
in own company stock (e.g., Benartzi, 2001; and Cohen, 2006) because investments in familiar
assets are likely to require less information acquisition costs or advice. These distortions can also
have equilibrium implications on the level of securities prices (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 1999) and the covariance structure of returns (e.g., Pirinsky and Wang, 2006).
1.3 Institutional Background on Securities Arbitration
Securities arbitration was initiated by the NYSE in 1872 and the NASD in 1968. The NASD is by
far the dominant forum for resolving disputes between investor and brokerage firms with over 90%
of cases filed in its forum. Almost all customer brokerage contracts include predispute arbitration
agreements that force investors to opt out of litigation in courts by binding them to adjudicate their
10Alternatively, investors could also respond to their lack of faith in professional advisors by relying on their peers
for investment advice. This might explain some of the social interaction effects that have been documented in the
behavior of retail investors (e.g., Duflo and Saez, 2002; and Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004).
claims in securities arbitration. However, it was not until 1987 that the Supreme Court ruled that
these agreements were enforceable." It was this ruling that effectively made SRO arbitration the
default dispute resolution mechanism between investors and brokers instead of commercial courts.
1.3.1 Disputes
The most common conflict between retail investors and securities brokers arises from the latter's
incentive to encourage inappropriate and unnecessary trading by their clients in order to increase
commissions revenue. Consequently, most investor-broker cases allege actions by brokers that
either directly or indirectly generate excessive commissions. The legal basis for these claims comes
from federal securities laws, most notably the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, especially section
10(b)-5 of this Act (Hazen, 2003). Allegations of direct actions mainly comprise of churning and
unauthorized trading claims. Churning occurs when a broker has control of a customer account and
makes trades more frequently than necessary with the purpose of generating commissions. Control
over an account can either be explicit, as is the case in discretionary accounts, or implicit. Implicit
controls arises when an investor relies heavily on the broker's recommendations. Unauthorized
trading involves the placement of transactions in non-discretionary accounts by the broker without
obtaining prior approval from the client.
Meanwhile, indirect actions cover behavior that is meant to mislead investors to undertak-
ing unnecessary trades. This mainly consists of manipulating the disclosure of information about
investments or making faulty recommendations by misinterpreting or ignoring facts. The manipu-
lation of information involves either misrepresentation or omission. Misrepresentation occurs when
the broker makes mistakes or is untruthful in disclosing material facts to the client. Omission of
information consists of failing to disclose facts that are material to the customer's decision to invest.
The manipulation of investment recommendations falls under unsuitability claims. These indirect
actions can also result from other types of agency problems between the two parties, like insufficient
broker effort, which are particularly likely when actions are client-specific. For example, a broker
may be liable under these claims if he fails to learn and address the particular financial needs of
his client. Insufficient broker effort can also lead to a failure in following customer instructions.12
11For a historical legal background on these agreements, see Appendix A.12Securities arbitration is also used to resolve disputes between registered representatives (employees) and brokerage
firms as well as conflicts between brokerage firms. We do not focus on either of these disputes in this paper.
Other broad claims, like breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, provide additional information on
the nature of the relationship between the investor and the broker or the alleged actions.
Brokerage firms are almost always the primary respondents in investor-broker disputes because a
company is liable for the actions of its employees (when it profits from these actions) and employers
have deeper pockets than their employees. Beyond the actions of individual brokers, the brokerage
firm or the broker's supervisor, who is usually a retail branch manager, may also be liable for failing
to supervise the broker's activity.
1.3.2 Arbitrators
Arbitrators have more discretion than judges. While many observers claim that this discretion
is necessary to ensure the flexibility and effectiveness of arbitration (e.g., Perino, 2002), others
believe that it allows arbitrator bias to influence case outcomes.13 The most notable source of
this discretion is the limited grounds for overturning arbitration awards. 14 These grounds do not
include instances where arbitrators misunderstood or misapplied the law, only those where it is
established that they must have been aware of the law and chose to disregard it. 15 Furthermore,
arbitrators alone decide whether evidence is relevant to a case and their decisions cannot be vacated
on the basis of their determination of facts. 16 Arbitrators are not even required to follow precedent
from case law or previous arbitration decisions. Judicial review is further handicapped because,
unlike judges, arbitrators are not required (and rarely choose) to provide written opinions in their
decisions. 17 Unsurprisingly, the vacatur of investor-broker arbitration awards is extremely rare.
At the NASD, there are two major classifications for arbitrators: public and industry. Public
arbitrators are supposed to have no ties to the securities industry while industry arbitrators have
current or recent professional associations either as registered representatives or attorneys doing
business with brokerage firms."s Depending on the amount of damages claimed, an investor-
'
3 See, e.g. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
14See Chapter 1, Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
'
5 See, e.g. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. (1997) 128 F.3d 1456 for an example (of an employee-firm
case) where this standard was applied in vacating a securities arbitration award.
16Rule 10323 of the NASD's Uniform Code of Arbitration states: "The arbitrators shall determine the materiality
and relevance of any evidence proffered and shall not be bound by rules governing the admissibility of evidence."
17In 2005, the NASD proposed a rule change (SR-NASD-2005-032) that would give either party in a dispute the
right to request that arbitrators provide reasoned decisions at an additional cost. These decisions would "stat[e]
the reasons that each alleged cause of action was granted or denied" but would not need to explain specific damage
calculations.
1sFor a precise definition of an industry arbitrator, see Rule 10308(4) of the NASD's Uniform Code of Arbitration.
broker case will either have one public arbitrator or a three-member panel consisting of two public
arbitrators and one industry arbitrator. Once a panel is selected, one of the arbitrators (usually a
public one) is assigned as the chairperson. The special duties of the chairperson include presiding
over the pre-hearing conference (where discovery and other issues are resolved), maintaining order
in case proceedings, and taking a lead in questioning disputants.
Public arbitrators make up the majority of a panel in order to preserve the appearance of impar-
tiality and reduce the risks associated with undisclosed conflicts of interest by industry arbitrators.
However, critics have pointed out that certain public arbitrators are subject to conflicts as well:
some are retired brokers and attorneys or have non-professional links to industry.19 Furthermore,
if brokerage firms have substantial influence in selection, public arbitrators may also avoid giving
investors large awards to ensure future selection to panels. Given their diverse backgrounds, public
arbitrators also vary in their ability to precisely determine the merits of a case. As a result, an
argument can be made that arbitration outcomes are more sensitive to which public, rather than
industry, arbitrators are selected.
Meanwhile, the inclusion of industry arbitrators on panels has received a great deal of public
scrutiny. Observers contend that industry arbitrators induce a bias in decisions by, for example:
"sanction[ing] industry practices that have become institutionalized and apply[ing] the
standard of their own practices, rather than [mandated practices]." 20
On the other hand, industry arbitrators have more expertise in the material issues of a case. As
Perino (2002) points out:
"[t]his is one of the key benefits of arbitration because expertise theoretically allows
arbitrators to render more accurate rulings on complex, technical, and often arcane
questions. Such expertise typically comes from working in or with the industry."
1.3.3 Arbitrator Selection and the NLSS Rules Change
The arbitrator selection process involves investors, brokerage firms, and the NASD. By most ac-
counts, this process is extremely adversarial. Solin (2004) remarks that:
19See, e.g. "Rough Justice: Wall Street Panels for Settling Fights Draw Renewed Fire" in Wall Street Journal,03/17/05.
20See the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association's statement submitted at the House Committee on Financial
Services's hearing on securities arbitration (03/17/05).
"[t]here is nothing more important than the selection of the arbitrators who will hear
[the] dispute... [C]onsiderable effort is expended by securities lawyers to determine
whatever they can about prospective arbitrators... [e.g.] obtaining copies of prior
awards by each proposed arbitrator... [and] contacting attorneys who participated in
hearings before that arbitrator."
Indeed, under the current selection regime (described below), parties often fail to reach consensus
on a tribunal in the first round of selection. As a result, the analysis of panel selection seems
well-placed to address the question of industry favoritism and overall expertise in enforcement. As
mentioned in the introduction, there was a substantial change to this process during the sample
period and I describe the selection of three-member panels under both the old and new procedures.
Since public and industry arbitrators are not substitutes in selection (there are 2 public and 1
industry arbitrators selected), the selection of public and industry arbitrators should be considered
as separate selection processes (although they are governed by the same rules).
Under the old procedure, the NASD had full discretion in proposing an initial panel of three
arbitrators. Each party would be able to dismiss one arbitrator by exercising a peremptory strike. If
necessary, the NASD would also choose replacement arbitrators and, afterwards, parties could only
request dismissal of further arbitrators through challenges for cause. Decision to grant this request
belonged to the NASD. As remarked in the Ruder Commission Report (NASD, 1996), parties only
had a limited opportunity to participate in the selection of arbitrators under this process.
In November 1998, a new selection process (called the Neutral List Selection System (NLSS))
was implemented in response to recommendations by a securities arbitration task force. This task
force was formed by the NASD in September 1994 to study general issues in securities arbitration.
While recommendations were made in January 1996, the proposed changes in arbitrator selection
could not be implemented until approval was granted by the SEC almost three years later. As a
result, the timing of this event had an exogenous component. The recommendations were made to
address investor concerns regarding NASD control and their own lack of control over selection, but
were not a response to evidence of bias, including selection on bias, under existing rules. Under
the NLSS, two computer-generated lists are sent to both parties. The first list contains 10 public
arbitrators and the second contains 5 industry arbitrators. Parties can initially strike any number
of arbitrators from each list and rank the remaining ones. These rankings are used, without staff
discretion, to choose arbitrators. If a full panel has not been determined after this first stage,
additional arbitrators are selected by computer algorithm and rounds of challenges for cause (as in
the old system) are played. Practioners generally agree that the main impact of this rule change
was a significant reduction of NASD involvement in selection and increased input by claimants and
respondents.
1.4 Data Construction and Descriptive Results
The data in this paper comes from three sources: (i) The NASD arbitration awards folder of
Lexis-Nexis's federal securities library, (ii) the Securities Industry Yearbooks which are published
annually by the SIA, and (iii) the Central Registration Depository (CRD) which is available online
through the NASD BrokerCheck search engine.
I obtain information on securities arbitration cases from NASD arbitration decisions. To get
these awards, I perform a search of NASD decisions in Lexis-Nexis using the keyword "award"
(which shows up in the header of all decision files). This search covers the period from January 1991
to December 2004 and yields 21,031 cases. In order to deal with the enormous output of this search,
I create a computer program to parse through each file and extract all formulaic and standardized
entries in the text. This includes basic information about the case (e.g. location and dates), claim
type dummies, and the identities of participants in the case (including the arbitrators). Whenever
relevant, arbitrator names are cleaned of errors by cross-checking suspicious entries using hearing
location and signatures from original documents (available online through the SAC-CCH Awards
Network). It is not possible to accurately extract the level of damages (both compensatory and
punitive) that are requested and awarded using this program.21 This information, along with other
decisions like counterclaims or third-party claims (by respondents) and dismissal or expungement
(by arbitrators), is gathered manually. All cases that do not involve retail investors suing brokerage
firms are removed from the main sample.22 This leaves 15,983 cases. The award-to-claim ratio is
available for 13,915 cases and all other covariates are available for 15,306 cases.
21This is principally due to two reasons. First, unlike most case summaries, damage requests and awards are written
in natural rather than legal language and, therefore, are not standardized enough to accurately extract by algorithm.
Second, further complications arise from the fact that we do not include requests and awards of interest or attorney
fees in our measures (because precise numbers for these are not always provided by claimants and arbitrators).22These include: registered representative v. brokerage firm (vice versa), firm v. firm, investor v. registered
representative (but no firm included) and firm v. investor.
I report summary statistics of the case characteristics in the main sample in Panel A of Table
1. Monetary claim, denoted as Claimi, is defined as compensatory damages claimed (winsorized
at the 95th percentile). This variable does not include requests for interest and attorney fees.
Throughout the paper, the subscript i will be used to index cases. The distribution of Claimi
exhibits substantial positive skewness with a mean (239,864 dollars) that roughly equals the 75th
percentile value (250,000 dollars). The median claim value is 73,002 dollars, suggesting that, from
the standpoint of damages claimed, most securities arbitration cases are important to investors and
registered representatives but are unlikely to have a direct impact on the profitability of brokerage
firms. Punitive damages are requested in 56 percent of cases. Disputes include an average of 3.01
allegation types listed in Section 3.1. As shown in Panel B, twelve percent (41 percent) of these
allegations claim that the broker directly (indirectly) generated excess commissions. Breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence each represent about 15 percent of allegations, respectively. Failure
to supervise the account manager represents 10 percent of allegations.
Various measures of case outcomes are recorded from the award dockets. The measure that
is used in the analysis is Decisioni which equals the monetary award-to-claim ratio.2 3 Monetary
awards are calculated using the same convention as Claimi. The distribution of Decisioni is heavily
censored, with 47.2 percent (10.8 percent) of the observations equal to zero (one), and its average
is 0.284. The other measures of case outcome, which are also summarized in Table 1, are punitive
award grants, dismissals, and expungements of public disciplinary records. PunitiveAwdi is a
dummy equal to one if punitive damages are awarded. Such awards are rare, they are granted less
than 7 percent of the time when requested. Thirty-seven percent of cases are dismissed while 20
percent of cases that include employees are cleared from that person's central registration depository
(CRD) record.
As a first proxy for arbitrator bias, I compute claim-weighted averages of Decisioni over each
arbitrator's case load. This is denoted by Decisionj where j indexes arbitrators. One important
weakness of this proxy is its failure to account for systematic differences in case quality across
arbitrators. An attempt is made to control for this by estimating expected decisions using the least
squares regression,
23Since compensatory awards occasionally include payment for interest, Decisioni is higher than 1 in less than one
percent of cases. In reported results, I cap the value of Decisioni at 1 (though doing this does not affect any results).
Decisioni = aCt + ab + E -Xi + ~i, (1.1)
where a•c and ab are cityxyear and firm fixed-effects, respectively, and Xi is a vector of observable
case characteristics. 24 The inclusion of brokerage firm fixed-effects is meant to capture variation in
firm-wide practices and, as suggested in McCaffrey and Hart (1998), differences in the aggressiveness
of legal defense teams across firms. In order to properly specify brokerage firm fixed-effects, data
on mergers and acquisitions and name changes in the brokerage industry are collected from the
Securities Industry Yearbooks published during the sample period. Following the suggestion of
practitioners, action-state claims with breach of fiduciary and/or negligence claims are allowed
to differ in average quality from those without such claims. This is accomplished by including
all interactions between these two groups of dummies in Xi. Estimates of this regression and
related ones are reported in Table 2. I then define the pro-industriness of a case's outcome as
the difference between E[Decisioni] and Decisioni where the expectation is winsorized at the 5th
and 95th percentiles. I winsorize to avoid negative expected decisions while preserving symmetry.
I then construct two additional measures of arbitrator bias by taking claim-weighted averages of
case pro-industriness from specifications estimated with and without brokerage firm fixed-effects.
These proxies are denoted by ProIndj and ProIndjE, respectively. Since I cannot control for
unobservable case characteristics, it is possible that these proxies are partly driven by arbitrators
being systematically assigned to cases of different quality. I attempt to address this possibility in
section 7.1 by verifying that the proxies are correlated with observable differences in opinion.
Meanwhile, three measures of arbitrator expertise are constructed. Since individuals with a
legal background are more likely to know how to apply the nuances of the law to a given case,
I use a lawyer dummy, Lawyerj, as my first measure of expertise. In particular, I classify an
arbitrator as a lawyer by examining the inclusion of Esq and JD suffixes to arbitrator names in
award documents. I also use two other proxies for expertise that vary over time. The first one,
ChairExperienceij equals one if an arbitrator has served as a chairperson in a case previous to i's
filing. Such experience is believed to capture expertise because chairpersons go through additional
24All of the results in the paper remain qualitatively unchanged when estimating expected decisions using censored
Tobit rather than least squares specifications for decisions.
arbitrator training (through the NASD) and being a chairperson is more demanding for arbitrators.
The second time-varying measure quantifies how a current case matches up with each arbitrator's
past case load. This measure, CaseExperienceij, is defined as the proportion of allegations in case
i that arbitrator j has had experience with in the past.
Table 3 reports information on the distribution of arbitrator characteristics. In addition to the
proxies for arbitrator bias and expertise, the number of selections, tenure length, home state and
public/industry classification are inferred. Selectionsj denotes the number of cases that j sits on
where either a decision is rendered by the arbitration panel or a stipulated award (or other type
of observable settlement) is agreed on by the parties and provided to the arbitrators. The average
number of observed selections is 4.96, with substantial variation, and is higher for public (5.61)
than for industry arbitrators (4.03). One concern regarding this measure of selection is that the
sample of publicly available selections suffers from selection bias due to unobserved settlements.
In section 7.3, I make an effort to address this issue by making use of observed settlements in the
data. Public and industry classifications are almost always included in case dockets and I classify
an arbitrator as industry (i.e., Industryj = 1) if he is ever listed as one in the sample. Forty-one
percent of arbitrators are classified as industry. Tenurej, measured as the length of time between
the filing date of j's first case and the decision date of his last case, is equal to 5.4 years on average.
Home city is the city where the arbitrator listens to the majority of his cases. It is only entered
if over half of j's cases occur in that city which leaves out approximately 400 arbitrators. Finally,
this data is augmented with information on the professional backgrounds of industry arbitrators by
attempting to match their names with the CRD database. This determines whether an arbitrator
was employed as a registered representative (in the two years prior to November 2005 when this
search was performed) and if he has been subject to any disciplinary actions. Among industry
arbitrators, 41 percent are brokers and 15 percent of them have been subject to disciplinary actions.
Panel D of Table 3 provides some preliminary evidence on arbitrator selection patterns. After
sorting arbitrators into selection quartiles, I find that arbitrators who are selected more frequently
are, on average, more pro-industry. These differences are statistically and economically significant.
For instance, arbitrators in the 4th quartile rule between an average of 2 to 7 percent more in favor
of industry than those in the 1st quartile. This represents an increase of between 8 to 29 percent
of the average award. There is also a noticeable pattern in arbitrator backgrounds across these
quartiles. For example, arbitrators who are selected more often are more likely to be lawyers. In
particular, 57 percent of arbitrators in the top selection quartile are lawyers compared to only 37
percent in the bottom quartile. This loosely suggests that both bias and expertise matter in the
selection process. The next two sections of the paper explore these patterns in more detail.
1.5 General Patterns in Arbitrator Selection
As a first step in the analysis, this section documents general patterns in the arbitrator selection.
The first subsection uses data pooled at the arbitrator-level to provide evidence of selection on bias
and expertise. The second subsection analyzes more detailed data on case-level selections and goes
beyond the analysis of section 5.1 by looking at how selection on bias and expertise vary across
different types of cases.
1.5.1 Arbitrator-Level Evidence
In this subsection, I assume that the number of times an arbitrator is selected to cases follows
a negative binomial model subject to some adjustments. This specification extends the Poisson
regression model by including random individual-effects. In particular, the conditional distribution
of Selectionsj is:
exp(-ftj).fts (1.2)
Pr(Selectionsj = SIAj, NAj, as) = S (1.2)
where
yj - &j. Nj.exp(8.Aj +a s) (1.3)
= &j exp (E Aj + In Nj + as),
Aj = (Biasj, Expertisej, Controlsj), Nj is the number of cases filed in j's home state during his
tenure, &j represents unobservable arbitrator characteristics, and as are home state fixed-effects.
In order to identify the model and maintain a closed-form likelihood function, aj is assumed to be
independently drawn from the gamma distribution:
*
5 0 - 1 ' exp(-ba)
&j - g(a) = I'(3) (1.4)F () (1.4)
where 6 is a parameter to be estimated. This specification assumes that the probability of j being
selected to a case is equal to exp(O -As + as) and that selection is independent across cases during
j's tenure. In addition to concerns of neglected heterogeneity, this model is chosen over the poisson
regression because of overdispersion in the selections data.25 This overdispersion is not surprising
given the unconditional mean and standard deviation of Selectionsj reported in Table 3.
Since potential arbitrators who are never selected to panels are not included in the dataset,
the estimation procedure accounts for truncation at Selectionsj = 0. This model is estimated by
maximum likelihood of the zero-truncated negative binomial model (see Cameron-Trivedi, 2005)
with:
pj = &j - exp( - Aj + In Nj + as) (1.5)
and the constraint 3 = 1. Reported standard errors account for clustering of the error term at
the home state-level. Allowing 3 to differ from 1 would permit the average probability of being
selected to a case to vary over j's tenure in such a way that it increases (decreases) with Nj when
0 > 1 (0 < 1). The first column of Table 4 shows that the constraint is rejected when estimating
the unrestricted model and suggests that the probability of being selected is not constant across
cases. Nevertheless, results with 3 = 1 imposed are presented because the unconstrained model
does not bound probabilities to be less than or equal to one.26 I delay analysis that accounts for
within arbitrator variation in selection probabilities to the next subsection which discusses case-level
evidence.
The second to fourth columns of Table 4 indicate that relatively more pro-industry arbitrators
are selected to a larger number of cases than relatively pro-investor ones, regardless of the bias
proxy used. Evaluating all other variables at their means, a decrease from the 75th to the 25th
25The Poisson distribution implies that the mean of a random variable equal its variance, while the negative
binomial model allows the variance to be higher than the mean (overdispersion).
2 6Estimates from the unconstrained model are qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar.
percentile in Decisionj (an increase in bias) is associated with a 7.8 percent increase in the expected
number of selections. However, the third and fourth columns show that this sensitivity to bias falls
noticeably when controlling for observable case characteristics in the construction of bias measures.
This estimated marginal effect is 4.5 percent when using the Prolndj measure and 1.7 percent
when using ProIndf E. The fifth and sixth columns run these regressions separately for public
and industry arbitrators and document that selection on bias is stronger and only statistically
significant in the public sample. Using ProIndf E, the estimated marginal effects for public and
industry arbitrators are 2.2 and 0.7 percent, respectively. Table 4 also shows that lawyers are
selected to cases more often (columns 1 to 4) and that this pattern is driven entirely by public
arbitrators (columns 5 and 6). Being a lawyer is associated with about a 14.2 percent increase in
selection probability. The corresponding estimates in the public and industry sample are 21.1 and
-0.9 percent, respectively.
The documented pattern of selection on bias in the sample of public arbitrators is consistent
with the view that brokerage firms have an advantage over investors and exploit this to select
arbitrators that have a tendency to rule in their favor. There are several explanations for the lack
of evidence on this pattern in the selection of industry arbitrators. First, since industry arbitrators
may be more homogeneous than public ones, the pro-industriness proxies for this group may be
driven by noise rather than bias (evidence of this will be presented in section 7.1). Second, bias
may be better captured by unobserved components in the backgrounds of industry arbitrators. The
RepRepj dummy is not a good proxy for this because it only identifies arbitrators who currently
are or recently were securities brokers while most other industry arbitrators held similar positions
in the past or have other significant ties to brokerage firms. It is also likely to be correlated with
another important control: availability. Finally, the pattern may not exist because investors put
most of their efforts in "fighting" brokerage firms on the selection of industry arbitrators and,
in turn, neglect to do so for public ones. The finding that public arbitrators who are lawyers get
selected more often to cases than non-lawyers supports the view that there is selection on expertise.
However, this result may partially be driven by lawyers being more available to arbitrate than non-
lawyers. I will attempt to address this in the case-level evidence by using alternative measures of
expertise. The fact that this pattern does not show up in the industry subsample is not surprising
because non-lawyers are almost universally considered "financial experts" on the basis of their work
experience in industry.
Although the marginal effects reported above are informative, they do not provide a direct es-
timate of the influence of selection on bias on the the pro-industry bias of tribunals. In order to do
this, I compute the expected bias of an arbitrator under the fitted distribution and a corresponding
one that is free of selection on bias. Specifically, for the fitted case, I obtain the expected number
of selections for each arbitrator, ESelectionsj, and define the expected bias as:
B s ESelectionsj
B s= kESelectionsl + ... + ESelectionsj (1.6)j=1
where the term in brackets is the inferred probability that arbitrator j is selected and J denotes
the total number of arbitrators. Benchmark is calculated similarly using a distribution that has a
coefficient of 0 on Biasj, but is otherwise identical to the fitted one. This distribution is meant to
approximate a setting where there is no selection on bias. My estimate of the effect of selection on
bias is the difference between these two measures (expressed as a percentage of the mean decision),
Bias* - Benchmark
Bias = 100 mean(Decision ) (1.7)
mean(Decisioni)
Table 4 reports that Bias ranges from 1.0 to 3.8 percent across specifications with this expected
increase in bias due to endogenous panel selection mostly coming from public arbitrators. While
these estimates are quite small, it is difficult to judge how much they are downward biased due to
measurement error in the pro-industriness proxies. 27
In summary, the arbitrator-level evidence suggests that there is both selection on bias and ex-
pertise. While point estimates indicate that expertise plays a greater role in selection and that
selection on bias does not substantially lower average enforcement levels, this may be due to im-
perfections in the constructed proxies for bias (e.g., measurement error). Furthermore, estimates
may be understated because the decision to file cases is endogenous: investors who are most hurt
by selection on bias may not file cases. Another important caveat is that the bias proxies only
27Moreover, it is not eve clear that there is even a downward bias in the estimates of Bias. While it is likely that
measurement error will pull estimates of selection on bias towards zero, it also increases the variance of the bias
distribution. The first effect lowers Bias while the second increases it.
attempt to capture relative bias, not absolute bias. Thus, even if we ignore imperfections in these
proxies, the findings in this subsection (and throughout the paper) only imply that selection on
bias leads to lower enforcement relative to an alternative with no selection on bias. I cannot rule
out the possibility that a significant absolute bias in favor of either party exists since this would
occur if all arbitrators were generally pro-industry (or pro-investor). Consequently, welfare implica-
tions of selection on bias cannot be determined without making assumptions about the population
distribution of bias.28
1.5.2 Case-Level Evidence
Next, I create a case-level selections dataset that keeps track in each case of the arbitrators who
were selected to that case, those who were available but were not selected, and arbitrator-case
characteristics. Since information on arbitrator availability is not publicly disclosed, I only classify
arbitrators as available in their home state and starting the day after their first selection in that
state until the day before their last decision. Observations on the date of an arbitrator's first
selection are not included since the arbitrator is, by definition, selected on a case that day. In each
state, all cases filed within the year following the first filing in that state or decided within the year
before the last decision in that state are omitted. I exclude these cases because the availability
proxy understates the number of available arbitrators towards the beginning and the end of my
sample. For instance, in the first filing in any state, the arbitrator selected will be, by construction,
the only available arbitrator since no one else's tenure window will have begun. In all, the data used
for estimation contains 9,983 cases and, on average, over 100 public and 40 industry arbitrators
available for selection.
In addition to the independent variables used in section 5.1, five more arbitrator and arbitrator-
case characteristics are added in this analysis. Two of these variables are used as additional proxies
for an arbitrator's expertise. The first, ChairExperienceij, is a dummy that equals one if an
arbitrator has served as a chairperson in the past. The second, CaseExperienceij, is a measure
of how well an arbitrator's case experience matches up to the allegations of the current case. It
is defined as the fraction of case i's allegations (out of the list described in section 3.1) that have
also been alleged in at least one of arbitrator j's previous cases. Meanwhile, Lengthy denotes the
28For instance, selection on bias is welfare destroying if the average arbitrator does not have an absolute bias in
favor of investors.
average amount of time (in years) needed to resolve cases where j is selected as an arbitrator.
Since the length of a case is regularly driven by an arbitrator's availability in scheduling hearing
dates, this variable captures an arbitrator's role in resolving cases quickly. Tenureij measures the
length of time, as of case i's filing date, that has elapsed since j's first selection. It is included
because arbitrators may become more or less available (or more knowledgeable) over their tenure
as suggested in the first column of Table 4. Finally, I proxy for variation in the degree of availability
among arbitrators by keeping track of which arbitrators are already sitting on panels for other cases
when case i is filed. This dummy variable is denoted by Panelij.
I model the arbitrator selection process using a logistic distribution with case fixed-effects
(Chamberlain, 1980). The main advantage of this distribution over a standard logistic model is
that it conditions the likelihood function on the number of arbitrators selected to a case.29 Specif-
ically, arbitrator j is selected to case i (i.e., Selectedij = 1) if and only if:
Uij = ai + G -Aij + Eij 0, (1.8)
where Aij = (Biasj, Expertiseij, Controlsij) and eij follows a logistic distribution. Conditional on
a panel of size ni, this implies that the probability of observing a panel p is given by:
Ji(p)Pr(Paneli = = j= (p (1.9)
where Pi is the set of all possible panels of size ni and Ji(p) = j,,exp(EO Aij). Since the
selection of public and industry arbitrators is done separately in practice, I estimate a selection
model for each group. When ni = 1 (i.e., almost all industry arbitrator selections and all single
arbitrator panels), this specification is equivalent to the classical random utility model of McFadden
(1974). For ni > 1, it satisfies a number of intuitive properties. Most importantly, the likelihood of
being selected increases with characteristic aij if and only if the coefficient on this characteristic is
positive. Furthermore, when the number of potential arbitrators is large relative to ni, this function
can be shown to be a good approximation for the likelihood function obtained by a generalization of
29 Qualitatively identical results are obtained using the standard logistic regression. This estimation method has
been used by Kuhnen (2006) in a similar setting (the selection of multiple mutual fund directors).
the random utility model that incorporates the selection of multiple alternatives. I report standard
errors that take into account clustering at the home cityxyear level. This allows the error term to
be correlated both across- and within-arbitrators (within city and year, respectively). This form
of clustering is more conservative than clustering at the case-level because the latter clusters are
strict subsets of those used here.
As a first step, I replicate the results from section 5.1 at the case-level. Table 5 confirms the
earlier evidence by showing that there is statistically significant selection on bias and expertise for
public arbitrators, but only selection on expertise for industry arbitrators. The economic effects
of changes in the bias measures and Lawyerj on selection probabilities are similar to those from
the earlier analysis (from 3.1 to 5.4 percent and around 30 percent, respectively). 3o Selection on
expertise is also documented using the new measures of expertise. Arbitrators with experience as
chairpersons are around 46 percent more likely to be selected to cases while a move from the 25th to
the 75th percentile of case experience is associated with between a 37.4 and 48.1 percent increase in
selection probability. The strong correlation between ChairExperienceij and selection probability
may be explained by the fact that arbitrators are generally only picked as chairpersons when both
parties believe they have sufficient expertise to adequately perform the additional duties required
in this role. Other measures that affect selection probability are the size of panels and the number
of arbitrators available for selection (both of which are built directly into the likelihood function)
as well as Lengthj, Tenureij, and Panelij. The coefficient on Lengthj is negative and consistent
with the view that parties value the timely resolution of cases. Arbitrators are also more likely to
be selected as their tenure increases which confirms the finding that P3 = 1 in the arbitrator-level
results. The negative relationship between Panelij and selection probabilities suggests that less
available arbitrators are less likely to be selected to cases (or to accept selection). It should be
noted that the low pseudo-R2 values are expected given the imperfect proxies for availability and
the fact that all arbitrators have a very low probability of being selected since there are so many
arbitrators to choose from.
One of the main advantages of the case-level analysis is that it also allows for the exploration
30Throughout the remainder of the paper, I define the economic effect of a change in a variable x as the answer to
the following question: "If two otherwise identical arbitrators have x = zL and XH, how much more (or less) likely is
H to be selected to a 1-member panel?" If the effect is normalized by L's likelihood of selection, the answer to this
question has a simple form, exp(O -• (XH - XL)) - 1, where 0x is the estimated coefficient on x in the model (hence
the first term is a scaled odds-ratio). This convention is used because marginal effects are not well-defined in this
setting.
of how selection on bias and expertise vary across different types of cases. This analysis is done by
adding interactions between the bias (expertise) proxies and observable case characteristics. Given
the earlier findings, one might predict that selection on bias is stronger in cases that are more
important to brokerage firms. This prediction relies on the assumption that the ability to select
biased arbitrators is limited. If this were not the case, firms would simply select biased arbitrators
in every case without a need to allocate them where the marginal benefit of bias is highest. Such a
constraint is reasonable because there is a limited number of pro-industry arbitrators and influencing
panel selection to one's advantage may require costly effort. Furthermore, the SEC oversees SRO
arbitration and it is more likely to exercise its formal authority if bias is very pronounced (e.g.,
DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty, 2005). This view is consistent with the relatively small coefficients
on bias in the arbitrator-level regressions.
I consider three primary proxies for case importance: (i) the size of the brokerage firm being
sued, (ii) the firm's direct financial stake in a case, and (iii) the firm's reputational stake in the
case. The first, LargeBroki, equals one if a brokerage firm is listed among the top ten employers of
retail brokers in the Securities Industry Yearbooks in over 80% of the years in the sample in which
they operate independently (using publications between 1990-91 and 2004-05).31 Large brokerage
firms are included as the main respondent in almost one-third of the sample. This variable could
either be capturing variation in influence over the NASD, legal resources, experience in arbitration,
or reputational capital across brokerage firms. The second, HiClaimi, is a dummy equal to 1 if
the amount of compensatory damages requested is greater than or equal to the 7 5th percentile
value across cases (250,000 dollars). The last proxy, Supervisions, equals one if it is alleged that a
firm failed to supervise its employee. This measure is likely to be correlated with case importance
because it involves firm behavior rather than the actions of a particular broker. As a result, such
a case should have a greater effect on firm reputation and, if successful, could lead to other similar
complaints against the firm.
Similarly, selection on expertise should be stronger in complex cases. The first measure of case
complexity, ManyClaimsi, keeps track of whether many allegations are made in a case. It is a
31These firms are Merrill Lynch, Shearson Lehman Hutton (acquired by Smith Barney in July, 1993), Morgan
Stanley (also known as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and operating as Dean Witter Reynolds prior to May, 1997),
Citigroup (also known as Salomon Smith Barney and operating as Smith Barney and Smith Barney Harris Upham
prior to July, 1997) Prudential Securities (formerly known as Prudential-Bache), UBS Financial (also known as UBS
Paine Webber and operating as Paine Webber prior to November, 2000), A.G. Edwards, Edward D. Jones (also
known as Edward Jones), Charles Schwab, and Fidelity.
dummy that equals to one if the total number of allegations made by the investor (among those listed
in section 3.1) is greater than the mean number of allegations across cases. The second measure,
MargLevi, is a dummy variable set to one if a case involves margin or leveraged transactions.
These transactions are considered more complicated than simple purchases and sales of securities
and are more likely to involve complex financial instruments, like options. 32
Table 6 reports results on the allocation of bias and expertise across cases. Since selection on
bias is only documented in the selection of public arbitrators, this table (along with the analysis
in the next section) only focuses on selection in this group. The first three columns sort on the
primary measures of case importance. All three specifications confirm or suggest that selection on
bias is substantially higher in (and almost entirely driven by) cases that are classified as important.
The coefficient on bias is 0.054 and insignificant for small brokerage firms and 0.305 for large ones
with the difference being significant at the 5-percent level. The corresponding estimates when
sorting on HiClaimi and Supervision1 are 0.077 to 0.279 and 0.108 to 0.217, respectively (though
the differences are statistically weaker with HiClaimi being significant at the 10-percent level).
Economically, these changes are substantial. While arbitrators at the 75th and 2 5th percentile of
ProIndFE are about equally likely to be selected in unimportant cases, the pro-industry ones are
5.0 to 7.8 percent more likely to be selected in the important cases. As a more nuanced check
of the relationship between case importance and selection on bias, I look at how this relationship
varies when an employee is included as a defendant in a case. This inclusion has an ambiguous
effect on the importance of a case to brokerage firms because of two opposing factors. On the one
hand, individual brokers are valuable resources to these firms because customers maintain a direct
relationship with these individuals rather than with firms. Furthermore, public disclosure practices
are such that a loss in securities arbitration negatively impacts the CRD record of the registered
representative while usually leaving the firm's disclosure unchanged.33 On the other hand, firms may
be less concerned in these cases because they can use the employee as a scapegoat for the violation
(blame it on a "bad apple"). To decouple these two factors, I distinguish between cases that involve
32Allegations involving the use of options are widely perceived as being particularly complex. However, since
product classifications are infrequently reported in the NASD awards, tests using this measure have insufficient
power. In cases with available product classifications, I find that cases with MargLevi = 1 are five times more likely
to involve options than those with MargLevi = 0.
3 3 In particular, disclosure in the central registration depository only provides a "no" or "maybe" answer to whether
or not an employee or a firm has been subject to a disclosure (disciplinary) event. Most individuals have a "no" in
this entry while almost every brokerage firm has some disclosure event in its past.
large and small brokerage firms. Presumably, large brokerage firms can more convincingly attribute
violations to a small number of rogue employees rather than firm-wide practices, while individual
employees contribute a larger share of business to a small brokerage firm. Column 4 on Table 6
supports this view. When an employee is included in a case, the coefficient on bias increases from
-0.142 to 0.109 for small firms and decreases from 0.393 to 0.279 for large firms. The first difference
is statistically significant at the 5-percent level34
For the ChairExperienceij measure of expertise, the first three columns of Table 6 also indicate
a strong and uniform pattern in the allocation of expertise across measures of case importance:
selection on expertise is weaker in important cases. The fifth and sixth columns of the table suggest
that the allocation of expertise is stronger in complex cases, but only under the CaseExperienceij
measure. The coefficient on CaseExperienceij increases from 0.342 to 0.526 when ManyClaimsi
equals one, with the difference being significant at the 1-percent level. This difference is also
economically meaningful: moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of CaseExperienceij increases
selection probability by 48.4 percent in complex cases compared to 29.3 percent in the other cases.
Likewise, when sorting on MargLevi the coefficient goes from 0.407 to 0.526 which implies a similar
economic effect as in CaseExperienceij. However, despite the economic significance of this change,
this latter difference is not statistically significant at traditional levels (p-value of 0.182). The
coefficients on the other expertise measures, ChairExperienceij and (in unreported regressions)
Lawyerj, do not vary uniformly across case complexity. This does not necessarily refute the view
that expertise is allocated optimally across cases because public arbitrators who are lawyers or have
experience as chairpersons are quite common (61 and 63 percent, respectively), only those with case
experience that match specific cases are scarce. This may explain why ChairExperienceij has a
substantially larger effect on selection than CaseExperienceij.35
To summarize, these results provide further evidence that the patterns uncovered in the arbitrator-
34This finding suggests that securities arbitration can, to an extent, be exploited by brokerage firms to manipulate
the reputations of their brokers and that smaller brokerage firms take advantage of this opportunity. Similar (though
more incriminating) patterns have been uncovered in the disclosure of research analyst histories in the I/B/E/S
database (Ljungqvist, Malloy and Marston, 2006).
35If a desirable resource (e.g., arbitrator expertise) is available in abundant supply, it will not be forgone on
individual cases regardless of case characteristics (e.g., complexity). As a result, such a resource should have a large
impact on selection probability. However, assuming that resources have limited capacity (e.g., an arbitrator cannot
be selected too often), when a resource is limited, it will at times be "saved" for use when it is most desirable (e.g.,
complex cases) rather than being assigned on a first-come-first-serve basis. This optimal restraint will be associated
with a lower average influence on selection probability relative to the unlimited case, but will also produce a difference
in the effect across cases (e.g., complex vs. "not" complex).
level evidence truly represent selection on bias and expertise. In particular, they extend the obser-
vation of "limited" selection on bias and expertise by showing that both bias and scarce forms of
expertise are allocated across cases in ways that are consistent with economic theory.
1.6 Is the NASD Responsible for these Patterns?
While section 5 provides evidence of selection on bias and expertise, it does not identify what is
responsible for these patterns. With respect to selection on bias, two channels are consistent with
the evidence: (i) pro-industry favoritism within the NASD and (ii) other comparative advantages
that are enjoyed by brokerage firms. The latter advantages could take the form of a lower marginal
cost in inducing bias through selection (because brokerage firms are frequent participants in arbi-
tration or have better information about arbitrators) or a higher marginal benefit of bias (due to
reputation or the possibility of future complaints).36
In order to distinguish between these two channels, I look at how selection on bias and expertise
differ before and after the NLSS rules change. This event helps determine whether the NASD is
responsible for these patterns because each channel makes different predictions about how selection
on bias and expertise change after the NLSS switch. Under the industry favoritism hypothesis, the
drop in NASD control over panel selection is expected to reduce or even eliminate selection on bias.
However, if other comparative advantages drive selection on bias, such a change should not occur.
In fact, if the NASD used its discretion in arbitrator selection to help investors by picking initial
and replacement lists on the basis of arbitrator fairness, the magnitude of selection on bias could
increase because computer-generated lists would contain more variation in arbitrator bias.37 This
increase in heterogeneity could be exploited by brokerage firms to create even more bias in their
favor. Likewise, regarding selection on expertise, if the NASD played a special role in improving
the quality of arbitration, the NLSS switch might also be associated with a decrease in selection
on expertise.
Table 8 supports the view that the NASD is not responsible for selection bias. Using the
36In section 5, it would only have been possible to disentangle NASD favoritism from other comparative advantages
if information on the NASD's hand-picked lists was available. In this case, the favoritism channel could be isolated by
looking at selection to these list rather than selection to panels (which incorporates both NASD and investor-broker
actions).
37This is due to two factors: (i) NASD behavior before the change in selection and (ii) the fact that initial list go
from a size of 3 to 15 after the rules change.
ProIndj measure of bias, columns 1 and 2 of the table show that selection on bias increases after
the NLSS switch and that the magnitudes of the coefficients before and after the change are quite
different. Economically, a move from the 2 5th to 7 5th percentile of ProIndj leads to slightly more
than a 3 percent increase in expected selections in the pre-NLSS period compared to almost 9
percent post-NLSS. Columns 3 and 4 show similar results using ProIndFE with the pre-NLSS
estimates not being significant. However, due to low power, the differences are not statistically
significant in column 4 (though the post-NLSS estimate of selection on bias is significant).38 Overall,
the evidence strongly suggests that selection on bias did not decrease after the NLSS switch and
generally supports the view that it increased after the switch, but I cannot uniformly reject the
hypothesis that it remained the same during both periods. Nonetheless, the results indicate that
the NASD is at least not entirely responsible for selection on bias since this pattern is significant
following the rules change. 39
This suggests that at least some of the selection on bias is due to brokerage firm comparative
advantages. Consistent with the view that the NASD was helping investors mitigate this advantage,
Figure 1 shows that investors started seeking more help from other sources, namely lawyers, after
the rules change. The year after the change, the use of professional representation by investors in
cases with three arbitrators jumped from a relatively steady 80 percent to 85 percent and by 2003
had risen to around 90 percent (the change was even larger in cases with one arbitrator). Table 9
generally confirms this pattern in logit regressions that study the determinants of hiring professional
representation. These regressions include a post-NLSS dummy and other case characteristics as
controls. The coefficients on PostNLSSi (columns 1, 3, and 5) are positive and significant at the
1- to 5-percent levels in all specifications except in the 3-member subsample (which may be due
to low power, especially in column 3). As shown in the second, fourth, and sixth columns of this
table, this finding is relatively robust to replacement of the post-NLSS dummy with time-trend
variables. Specifically, these regressions find no evidence of increasing professional representation
35Table 19 performs a similar analysis to Table 8 with four alternative bias measures (described in the table notes)
and finds qualitatively identical results. In fact, the results are statistically stronger with the analog to column 4
being significant at the 5-percent level or better for 3 of the 4 measures.
39Table 7 provides further support for the view that NASD control may have been helping investors. In particular,
it finds that average decisions fell following the NLSS switch. When including the PostNLSSi variable in the
regressions on Decisioni from Table 2 (and removing the time fixed-effects), I find a negative and highly significant
coefficient of -0.051 to -0.058 (though the estimates are smaller when including broker fixed-effects). I also find that
the declining trend in Decisioni only appears following the rules change (the trend is estimated at 0.006 before and
-0.024 after the switch).
prior to the rules change and suggest that an increasing trend appears (and is often significant or
close to significant) in the post-NLSS period.
Regarding expertise, columns 1 through 4 of Table 8 show that selection on expertise fell
following the change. These changes are dramatic (with differences that are always significant at
the 1-percent level). While an arbitrator with experience as a chairperson was about 80 percent
more likely to be selected than an arbitrator without this experience prior the the NLSS switch, this
difference essentially disappeared after the change (the drop was significant but not as pronounced
with the lawyer measure of expertise). These changes are equally dramatic for CaseExperienceij:
the difference in expected selections between the 2 5th and 75th percentiles falls from roughly 55
percent to less than 6 percent. In fact, selection on this measure of expertise is no longer statistically
significant in the post-NLSS period. Consequently, it seems that the NASD uses its discretion to
help parties assign knowledgeable arbitrators to cases and is more successful in doing so than
investors and firms (who may neglect arbitrator expertise in the process of fighting over selection
along the bias dimension).
Of course, there are some concerns with attributing a causal interpretation to the simple anal-
ysis of Table 8. In the remainder of this section, I investigate three alternatives to the causal
interpretation and argue that none of them can explain all the changes in selection on bias and
expertise after the NLSS's implementation. The alternative explanations that I consider are: (i)
potential time-variation in case characteristics, (ii) the presence of time-trends in selection patterns,
and (iii) the endogeneity of the rules change. Consideration of a fourth alternative, time-variation
in external monitoring, is delayed to section 7.4 because it involves a different methodology than
the one employed here (duration analysis of arbitrator tenure).
1.6.1 Time-Variation in Case Characteristics
Given the evidence that selection on bias varies across cases, it is possible that some of the difference
in selection on bias before and after the NLSS switch is driven by changes in case characteristics
over time. Mean case characteristics over both sample periods are shown in Table 10 (for cases
with three panel members). While most allegations appear with similar frequency over the two
periods, the three allegations that are correlated with selection on bias (claim size, LargeBroki,
and Supervisioni) are larger or more common after the NLSS rules change. However, this variation
is unlikely to be caused by the rules change since none of the characteristics increase substantially
immediately after the switch. They are likely due to other gradual changes in the securities bro-
kerage market. For example, since the post-NLSS period coincides with the rise and fall of the
technology bubble (late 1990s and early 2000s), the post-NLSS period should exhibit an increase
in claim sizes because customers are wealthier. This prediction is supported by Figure 2 which
indicates that claim size closely tracks the market (with a lag): average compensatory damages rise
from about 350,000 dollars in 1998 to a high of over 500,000 dollars in 2001.
In order to verify whether the increased frequency of important cases explains all (or even
reverses) the change in selection on bias, I augment the specification from Table 8 by estimating
selection on bias before and after the rules change in both high and low case importance groups. For
each case importance dummy, Table 11 reports estimates of selection on bias across four groups of
cases: (i) high importance in the Pre-NLSS period, (ii) high importance in the Post-NLSS period,
(iii) low importance in the Pre-NLSS period, and (iv) low importance in the Post-NLSS period.
All models use Prolnd'E as the bias measure.40 Models la and lb use HiClaimi as a measure
of case importance and find that selection on bias is insignificant and does not change after the
NLSS switch for low claim cases. However, in high claim cases, the estimate of selection on bias
increases from 0.398 before to 0.704 after the rules change in model la which uses Lawyerj as
the expertise measure. This difference implies an increase in the economic effect from 11.9 to 22
percent and is significant at the 5-percent level. In model ib, which uses ChairExperienceij as
the expertise measure, the estimates coefficient increases from 0.182 to 0.440 which represents an
increase in the economic effect from 4.4 to 10.9 percent.41 Models 2a and 2b, which use LargeBroki,
produce a similar change in selection on bias for high importance cases. For example, in model
2b, the coefficient increases from 0.153 (insignificant) to 0.384 (significant at the 1-percent level)
or, equivalently, the economic effect increases from 3.7 to 9.4 percent. Using Supervisioni, models
3a and 3b produce similar changes, but they also indicate an increase for low importance cases
(with a coefficient increasing from 0.056 to a statistically significant 0.199 after the rules change for
model 3b). However, since only one of the differences from Table 11 is significant (while another is
borderline significant with a p-value of 0.119), the results should be interpreted as weakening the
4 0Results are qualitatively identical with ProInd3 used a the bias measure.41This result is not due to differences in claim distribution within either of the claim size groups. In fact, differences
before and after the change are even more pronounced when using the continuous variable In Claim, as an interaction
term instead of HiClaimi.
evidence from Table 8 that selection on bias decreased after the rules change.42 Nonetheless, it
should be highlighted that these findings continue to indicate that NASD favoritism is not wholly
responsible for selection on bias since this pattern is still significant in high importance cases (and
certain low importance ones) following the rules change.
1.6.2 Time-Trend in Selection Patterns
Another concern with attributing changes in selection patterns to the NLSS switch is that these
changes may reflect a gradual time-trend rather than the event. Figures 3 and 4 suggests that
a time-trend is not responsible for the results on bias and on one of the measures of expertise.
Specifically, these figures report results from fixed-effects logistic regressions over one-year long
windows relative to the NLSS switch date starting 4 years before the switch and ending 4 years
after the switch (eight regressions in total).43 Each figure plots the coefficients on bias or expertise
in the period between t and t + 1 years after the change (or before the change if t is negative) for
t = -4, ..., 3. Figure 3 suggests that there was no trend in selection on bias prior to the rules change
and there is a noticeable jump in selection on bias immediately following the NLSS switch (though
it is not statistically significant). Even with these noisier estimates, selection on bias is generally
statistically significant from t = 1 to 3. To my knowledge, no other significant event occurred
around this period that could have produced this pattern. Meanwhile, Figure 4 suggests that a
general decline in the CaseExperienceij coefficient is a more plausible explanation for the change in
selection on expertise for this measure. This may reflect gradual adjustments in arbitrator training
made by the NASD over time. Nonetheless, the drop in selection on ChairExperienceij between
t = -1 and t = 0 is sufficiently dramatic that it is unlikely to only reflect a downward time-trend:
the most reasonable interpretation is that much of this drop is due to the rules change.
1.6.3 Endogeneity of the Rules Change
While the timing of the change in arbitrator selection has a random component (due to admin-
istrative delays and frictions in implementation), the choice by the task force of which change to
propose and the timing of the task force's initiation were endogenous. As a result, the initiation
42Given the economic effects from Tables 8 and 11, it is clear that this drop in significance is due to low power
rather than a drop in the coefficient estimates.
43This window roughly corresponds to the largest symmetric window with a common government oversight regime.
I define a government oversight regime as a period with the same SEC Chairman (in this case, Arthur Levitt).
and proposal may have been made in response to unobservable changes in the enforcement envi-
ronment. If changes in the environment (e.g., increase in firms' legal resources) were expected to
increase selection on bias, this could explain the results documented in Table 8. Indeed, the rules
change may actually have lowered selection on bias in this case, just not enough to outweigh the
change in environment.
However, if this were the case, the increase in bias should have appeared around the initiation
or proposal dates rather than the implementation date which occurred almost three years later.
It is unlikely that these unobservable changes would just happen to start influencing arbitrator
selection immediately following the rules change. Since this was the case (see Figure 3), endogeneity
is unlikely to be driving the change in selection patterns. It is also difficult to imagine that the
findings are driven by an increase in investor influence over the NASD (which could also explain
the initiation of the task force) because this type of development would be expected to lead to a
fall rather than an increase in selection on bias. Indeed, this type of endogeneity probably makes
it tougher to detect an increase in selection on bias that is due to the change in arbitrator selection
rules.44
1.6.4 Discussion
To summarize, the results presented in this section point to a story where the NASD plays a positive
role in enhancing the efficiency of enforcement. Consistent with existing theory on the advantages
of self-regulation, the NASD is found to improve expertise in enforcement by increasing selection
on expertise (especially in subtler forms of expertise). Meanwhile, the change in selection on bias
does not support the hypothesis that self-regulation leads to lax enforcement of rules. In fact, the
evidence suggests that NASD control may be associated with stronger enforcement. This casts
doubt on the widespread view that self-regulation involves a trade-off between expertise and bias.
The lack of evidence on this trade-off suggests that it may not be in the NASD's interest to
favor brokerage firms over investors in the selection of arbitrators (relative to the NLSS regime).
To the extent that the NASD takes actions that are in the collective interest of member firms, this
points to a natural tension between ex-ante and ex-post incentives for individual brokerage firms.
Specifically, after being sued by an investor, brokerage firms want to minimize their liability by
44It is also unclear how endogeneity would be expected to lead to the decrease in selection on expertise.
trying to get pro-industry arbitrators selected to their case. They do this because of an externality:
they capture all the gains from influencing selection but only bear part of the social cost of reduced
enforcement quality.45 As in other public good problems, this can make all firms worse off ex-ante.
One view that is consistent with the evidence in this section, but stands in stark contrast to existing
theory, is that the NASD is an institutional solution to this problem. Namely, to the extent that
the NASD is designed to be isolated from member influence, it may allow the industry to commit
to better enforcement by reducing influence activities ex-post.
Of course, this view of the NASD as an effective enforcer is only speculative. Nonetheless, the
increase in selection on bias following the NLSS switch suggests that it may at least be desirable to
reduce the impact that other brokerage firm comparative advantages have on arbitrator selection.
One way to accomplish this may be to incorporate asymmetry in arbitrator selection rules that
favors the weaker party (the investor) by limiting the stronger party's ability to exercise peremptory
strikes or challenges for cause. While such asymmetry may induce some ex-post inefficiency, it may
improve ex-ante enforcement by eliminating some of the bias in selection that hurts investors.
The intuition behind this proposal is similar to the motivation for biased legal presumptions (e.g.,
Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 1998) and is related to some of the arguments made in literature on
auctions design with asymmetric bidders (e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1989; and Povel and Singh,
2006).46 An alternative is to provide additional help to investors who are most disadvantaged in
the hope that this reduces the comparative advantage of brokerage firms. 47,48
45This social cost can take the form of lower customer demand (product market discipline) or additional costly
monitoring and exercise of control in enforcement by the SEC.
46Unfortunately, heterogeneity in the degree of asymmetry between investors and brokerage firms complicates the
implementation of the optimal asymmetric selection process. This is due to the fact that the asymmetry in rules
depends on the specific parties to a dispute. Unlike an auction setting where the seller of a good is likely to have
a good idea of the degree of asymmetry among parties and has an interest in setting the optimal (i.e., revenue-
maximizing) asymmetry, determining the appropriate mechanism designer in our enforcement environment is not as
straightforward.
47An existing set of programs that partially tries to accomplish this are the securities arbitration clinics. These
clinics, which are joint initiatives of the NASD and various law schools, provides free legal representation to less
wealthy and often elderly investor claimants. However, while these programs are surely worthwhile, one might
wonder how effective they are in reducing broker comparative advantages which were found to be strongest in large
and more important cases.
48Given that the selection game after the NLSS switch shares many features in common with jury selection, the
following question arises: are customers at a disadvantage relative to firms in customer-firm disputes that go through
court and involve juries? Ignoring the question of the jurist distribution's average inclination (pro-customer vs.
pro-firm), the analysis of this paper suggests that jurist heterogeneity might benefit firms as well.
1.7 Robustness Checks
The main concerns regarding the findings in sections 5 and 6 that remain unaddressed are due
to imperfections in the bias, expertise and selections measures. To address these concerns and
a few others, I perform several robustness checks in this section. In order to reduce the effect
of measurement error in the bias proxies, all the regressions in section 7.1 restrict the sample to
arbitrators with at least 5 selections. These arbitrators represent 72 percent of the selections in the
data. For the most part, the use of alternative selections thresholds, or none at all, does not affect
the reported findings (whenever it does, I point it out below).
1.7.1 Misclassification of Bias
Because of potential misclassification in the bias measures, it is possible that the documented
relationship between bias and selection probability is due to an omitted arbitrator characteristic
that is picked up by the bias proxy. For instance, variation in this proxy could capture differences
in unobservable arbitrator skill if cases differ in unobservable quality and arbitrators with expertise
are, on average, assigned to cases of lower ex-ante quality.4 9 If this were the case, the earlier results
should be interpreted as further evidence of selection on expertise rather than selection on bias. In
order to partially mitigate this concern, I verify that the bias proxies are related to differences in
opinion across arbitrators.
Prior to doing this, it is necessary to show that the measures of bias help explain case outcomes.
If this were not the case, it would be difficult to argue that they capture arbitrator heterogeneity
along the bias dimension. In order to do this, I regress the bias of a panel on the pro-industriness
of a case's outcome (defined as the residual from equation (1.1) on p.29). To avoid a mechanical
relationship, the panel bias for case i is defined as the average individual bias of a panel's members
where the individual biases are computed as in ProIndj and ProIndfE but with the outcome of
case i removed from the sample. Table 12 shows that the coefficients on this regression are positive
and highly statistically significant for all the bias measures. Point estimates suggest that a unit
increase in the measures of panel bias are associated with between a 0.12 and 0.14 unit increase in
49The latter pattern is reasonable because ex-ante quality should be related to case complexity. In particular, since
the outcomes of "easy" cases are often known to all parties, investors will only file these cases if they know they are
likely to win them (high quality). Meanwhile, "tough" cases will be comprised of both low and high quality cases
and, therefore, will have a lower ex-ante quality.
the pro-industriness of a case's outcome. There are two reasons why this coefficient could be less
than one: (i) there is measurement error in the panel bias proxy, and (ii) arbitrator bias, though
persistent, is not constant over time. As columns 2 and 5 demonstrate, these coefficients do not
increase significantly before and after the NLSS change. This reduces concern that selection on
bias appears stronger in the post-NLSS period because of reduced measurement error in the bias
proxies over this period. If anything, point estimates indicate that measurement error may be
more prevalent after the rules change which biases against finding an increase in selection on bias.
Columns 3 and 6 documents that this predictive power of the panel's bias is driven by the public
arbitrators in the panel. This is consistent with the view that more variation in the bias measure is
due to noise for industry arbitrators and further reinforces the decision to focus on public arbitrator
selection patterns.
However, as mentioned earlier, the results of Table 12 could be attributable to arbitrators
receiving systematically different cases. To address this concern, it would be ideal to observe
multiple arbitrators making decisions on the same case to see whether differences in those decisions
are correlated with the bias proxies. I attempt to approximate this ideal by exploiting the fact
that securities arbitration prohibits the filing of class action suits. Instead, investors are required
to file their cases individually which induces a sequence of repeated cases decided on by distinct
arbitrators. I focus on one particular set of repeated cases: those filed against the analyst Jack
Grubman and Citigroup alleging misrepresentation and conflicts of interest in the research coverage
of Worldcom. In these cases, the alleged wrongdoing is relatively homogeneous (common analyst
reports) and, given the fact that the same law firm represented many of the claimants in my sample,
these cases are likely to have similar quality. The first two columns of Table 13 perform the same
regressions as Table 12 on this much smaller sample (131 cases with available panel bias measures)
and reports that the coefficients are still positive and statistically significant (at the 5- and 10-
percent levels of significance). Since investors are usually only aware of wrongdoing in their own
accounts, it is difficult for them to coordinate legal actions and, in turn, very few other repeated
cases can be identified in the data. I find an additional 17 groups of repeated cases, for a total of 55
cases, using the following screening algorithm: two cases are classified as part of the same repeated
group if they contain similar allegations, are filed within two days of each other in the same state
against the same brokerage firm, and either include the same individual broker as respondent or
members of the same family as claimants."5 As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 13, adding these
cases to the Grubman sample and running the same regressions from the first two columns (with
fixed-effects for each repeated group) produces virtually identical results which are slightly more
significant.
An alternative strategy to identify differences in opinions takes advantage of the fact that many
decisions are made by panels rather than individual arbitrators. Though arbitration panels usu-
ally find a middle ground when deciding case outcomes, they are not always successful in doing
so and an arbitrator occasionally dissents from the majority. This is a public display of differ-
ence in opinion. If the measures of bias are adequate, they should predict the probability of such
disagreements. To investigate this, I model dissent using a logistic model with within panel dis-
persion in bias and other controls as explanatory variables. The other controls are AvgLawyeri
and AvgChairExperiencei (which are averages of Lawyerj and ChairExperienceij over the panel,
respectively), claim characteristics (including claim type dummies), and the pro-industriness of a
case squared (which measures how unusual a decision is given observables). Columns 1 and 3 in
Table 15 indicate that dispersion in ProIndj within a panel, defined as:
DispProIndi = max Prolndj - min Prolndj, (1.10)jCPi jiEP
is positively correlated to the probability of dissent as predicted (significance at the 1- and 5-percent
levels). When an alternative measure of within panel dispersion in bias is used, namely a dummy
equal to 1 if DispProIndi or DispProIndFE is above its 90th percentile, identical and statistically
stronger results are obtained.
Overall, these results suggest that the measures of arbitrator bias used in Section 5 capture
differences in opinion across arbitrators. Thus, pure misclassification is unlikely to be driving
my findings. Nevertheless, it is possible that the bias proxy, while being adequate, is correlated
with unobservable arbitrator expertise and that it is this correlation, rather than bias itself, that
produces the results.51 However, I believe that this omitted variables problem is unlikely to explain
50 One exception to this rule is a set of cases filed against Merrill Lynch regarding misrepresentations in an investment
fund (the Focus 20 Fund).
51Two attempts were made to directly rule this out. First, using arbitrator characteristics that are presumably
orthogonal to expertise, namely sex and race, an optimal instrument was constructed following Amemiya (1974) but it
was not sufficiently strong. The fact that this instrument is weak is not surprising given that there is no a priori reason
my findings. If it did, the coefficients on the bias measures would be expected to closely follow
those on the observable expertise measures. As Tables 6 and 8 show, this is not the case.
1.7.2 Misclassification of Expertise
There are also potential problems with a causal interpretation of the positive correlation between
my measures of arbitrator expertise and selection to panels. As in the case of the arbitrator bias
proxies, one concern is the possibility of misclassification of expertise. In order to address this,
I verify that my measures of expertise predict the likelihood of selection as a chairperson. As
mentioned earlier, selection as a chairperson is expected to be influenced by expertise because it
imposes additional duties on arbitrators that require expertise to be undertaken effectively. This
selection is also unlikely to be influenced by bias because both parties can veto an arbitrator's
selection as a chairperson.
To investigate the determinants of chairperson selection, I construct a selection model similar to
the one used in the case-level analysis of sections 5 and 6. However, in this setting only arbitrators
who have been selected to a case are considered as potential chairpersons. I estimate this model
using the logit model with case fixed-effects which, in this setting, is identical to a random-utility
model because only one chairperson is selected. Table 16 confirms that each of the expertise
measures are significant in predicting the likelihood of selection as a chairperson. These results add
credibility to the use of these measures as proxies for expertise. Finally, it is important to note that
the coefficients on the pro-industriness measures are insignificant. This further reduces concerns
that the bias proxies measure unobserved arbitrator expertise.
1.7.3 Settlements
The presence of unobserved settlements can also bias my results. For example, if pro-industry
arbitrators have a higher propensity to settle cases, then the earlier analysis will understate the
extent of selection on bias. On the other hand, if pro-investor arbitrators are more likely to sit
on cases that settle, the evidence of selection on bias may simply be a reflection of the fact that
to believe that men are more biased than woman (vice-versa) or that bias differs systematically across race. Second,
data was collected on arbitrators who were dropped from panels due to accident, death or illness. If unobserved
expertise is driving my findings, then the bias of the dropped arbitrator should still be positively correlated with the
case's outcome. Table 14 suggests that this is not the case though low power (due to the small number of dropped
arbitrators identified in the data) makes it impossible to draw conclusions from these results.
the selections data is more downward biased for pro-investor arbitrators than for pro-industry
ones. In order to verify whether either scenario is reasonable, I investigate whether the measures
of panel bias and expertise predict the probability of observed settlements. While observed and
unobserved settlements are not necessarily governed in the same way, one would expect arbitrator
characteristics to more strongly influence observed settlements where arbitrators usually play a
more meaningful role in shaping the terms of the settlement.
Table 17 reports the coefficients of logistic regressions of settlement on arbitrator and case
characteristics. It is clear from this table that bias does not have a significant correlation with
settlement rates. In fact, the sign on bias is positive when using ProIndPani and sometimes
negative when using ProIndPanFE. Interestingly, the sign on expertise tends to be negative and
significant. This implies that the earlier analysis may overstate how much more often experts are
selected to cases. The only other controls that seem to influence the likelihood of settlement is the
inclusion of an employee as a respondent and claim size. The employee inclusion relationship is
not surprising: employees are likely to find it in their interests to settle because doing so increases
the chance that they avoid public disclosure of the lawsuit in their CRD records. There is also an
increase in settlement activity over time (though this does not occur suddenly around the change
in arbitrator selection rules).
Overall, there is no evidence that arbitrator bias influences the rate of even observed settlements.
This should partially reduce concerns that incomplete measurement of arbitrator selections, due to
settlement activity, is generating the evidence of selection on bias.
1.7.4 Arbitrator Tenure
The evidence of selection on bias indicates that conditional on being in the list of potential arbitra-
tors, pro-industry arbitrators are more likely to be selected to arbitration panels. However, there
are other ways that an industry bias can be introduced into securities arbitration. For instance,
this could be achieved if pro-investor arbitrators exited the list of potential arbitrators more quickly
than pro-industry ones.
To investigate whether such an exit pattern exists, I employ a standard technique from survival
analysis. In particular, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1975) with the following
semi-parametric specification for the hazard function:
h(t) = ho(t) - exp (a, + Oo -Biasj + 01 -PostNLSSt x Biasj + 02 - Lawyerj) ,
where the baseline hazard function, ho(t), need not be specified because the model is estimated
by conditioning out ho(t) using the partial likelihood approach.52 Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. This specification allows for a change in the hazard rate's sensitivity to arbitrator
bias following the NLSS switch. In modeling arbitrator tenure, there are several advantages to
using duration models. For example, these models are sufficiently flexible to account for the fact
that many arbitrators are still on the NASD list at the end of the sample period. I assume that
arbitrators whose tenure windows end in the last year of the sample have not exited the NASD list.
This induces individual-specific censoring in about half of the observations.53
The first four columns of Table 18 report results from the sample of public arbitrators. Columns
1 and 3 show that more pro-industry arbitrators have lower instantaneous probabilities of leaving
the pool of potential arbitrators under both bias measures (since the coefficients on ProIndj and
ProIndFE are negative at the 1- and 5-percent levels). Arbitrators at the 75th percentile of ProIndj
(ProIndRfE) have exit rates that are 8.6 percent (6.4 percent) lower than those at the 25th percentile.
Furthermore, unlike the analysis from section 5, this pattern also obtains in the sample of industry
arbitrators. Using ProIndfE, industry arbitrators at the 75th percentile of bias have exit rates that
are 9.1 percent lower than those at the 25th percentile. Since the NASD has formal control over the
list of potential arbitrators, one might be tempted to view these results as evidence of favoritism
within the NASD. However, while the NASD exercises control in admitting new arbitrators, it claims
not to forcibly remove someone from the arbitrator pool unless that person is rarely available to sit
on cases. Consequently, most tenures may be ending at the discretion of the individual arbitrator.
Thus, the relationship between exit rates and bias may also be explained by factors not directly
related to NASD behavior. For example, it has been reported that arbitrators occasionally receive
benefits from brokerage firms through avenues other than selection to cases (e.g., by serving as
expert witnesses for them in other legal disputes). If such benefits are only provided to pro-industry
arbitrators and only while they are members of the arbitrator pool, then pro-industry arbitrators
52For a small dt > 0, h(t)dt can be interpreted as the probability of exiting between t and t + dt given survival
until t.
53Reported results are not sensitive to the particular rule used to determine censoring of individual observations.
(1.11)
will have an incentive to extend their tenures longer than pro-investor arbitrators. Furthermore,
to the extent that arbitration is more favorable to industry than investors, pro-investor arbitrators
may choose to leave the pool early out of frustration for not being selected (regardless of whether
or not the NASD is responsible for this industry favoritism).
Table 18 also attempts to rule out the possibility that the increase in selection on bias after
the NLSS switch is due to a drop in external monitoring. Specifically, given increased participation
in selection by investors and brokerage firms, the NASD may have found it easier to avoid direct
suspicion for bias in arbitrator selection following the rules change. Though it is unclear why
such a drop in accountability would impact selection on expertise, it could explain the increase
in selection on bias. In particular, because the NASD continued to have limited control over the
selection process (discretion in granting challenges for cause), it could have responded to weaker
accountability by becoming more aggressive in using this discretion to induce an industry bias.
However, if this were the case, one might also expect an increase in the sensitivity of exit to bias
in the arbitrator tenure regressions because the NASD has even more formal control over the pool
of arbitrators than it does over granting challenges for cause during the post-NLSS period. As
columns 2 and 4 of Table 18 show, there is no evidence that exit on bias increased.54 Moreover,
as mentioned earlier, the NASD has limited discretion in granting challenges for cause because of
explicit guidelines to be followed in making this decision: it can only grant a challenge if a party
presents documentable evidence that an arbitrator has conflicts of interest with one of the parties
in a case (e.g., brokerage firm, lawyer, etc).
1.7.5 Other Robustness Checks
I perform additional robustness checks to address some other imperfections in the analysis. Since
each robustness check involves repeating all the regressions from section 5 and 6 (either with a
different samples or with new independent variables), I only describe the relevant results rather
than reporting all coefficients in tables.
Since the data is generated using a snapshot of arbitration awards over a fixed interval of time,
54 0n the other hand, one might argue that the implementation of the NLSS only made it easier for the NASD to
avoid suspicion in the selection of arbitrators and not for its list management. In this case, post-NLSS effects would
only be expected to show up in selection on bias (as is the case in the data). However, such a differential effect
requires monitors to separately keep track of the arbitrator pool and arbitrator selections which is unlikely given that
the NASD list is not publicly disclosed.
bias may be induced by using measures constructed with incomplete histories on arbitrators who
are selected to panels prior to the beginning of the sample period. In order to see whether this is
the case, I redo the analysis after dropping the arbitrators who are most likely to have been selected
to cases prior to the beginning of the sample period: those who are selected to cases within a year
(or two years) following the filing of the first case in my sample. All the findings on selection on
bias and expertise remain unchanged.
A potentially more serious issue exists with the CaseExperienceij measure. Specifically, by
construction, this measure of expertise is likely to be correlated with the number of times an ar-
bitrator has been selected in the past. Since the number of past selections can reflect both bias
and past availability (which is likely to predict future availability), this can lead to problems in
determining whether selection on CaseExperienceij really captures the influence of expertise on
selection patterns. To address this, I create an alternative measure of case experience, denoted as
CaseExperiencej, defined as the residual from the regression:
CaseExperienceij = a + 1 " PastSelectionsij + #2 - Tenureij + P3 - Biasj + cij. (1.12)
I then redo the analysis from Tables 5, 6 and 8 with CaseExperienceý used in place of CaseExperienceij
and PastSelectionsij included in all specifications. Again, all the findings from sections 5 and 6 re-
main qualitatively unchanged. The only notable difference is that coefficients on CaseExperiencefi
are around 30 percent smaller in magnitude than those on CaseExperienceij. Interestingly, the
difference in allocation of case experience across case complexity becomes even more pronounced
with this alternative measure (though, as in Table 6, the difference when using MargLevi as a
measure of complexity is still marginally insignificant with a p-value of 0.102). As expected from
the discussion above, the coefficient on PastSelectionsij is also positive and highly significant.
1.8 Conclusion
Self-regulatory organizations play an important role in the regulation of many financial markets,
particularly in the implementation of enforcement. In this paper, I attempt to evaluate this type
of enforcement by analyzing whether self-regulation has the benefit of leading to more expertise
and/or the cost of leading to more bias in enforcement.
Using data on securities arbitration cases at the NASD, I focus on one of the most important
stages of this enforcement process: arbitrator selection. In the first stage of the analysis, I document
general patterns in arbitrator selection and provide evidence that arbitrators who are classified as
pro-industry or as having more expertise are selected more often to arbitration panels (selection on
bias and expertise, respectively). Furthermore, I provide evidence that arbitrator bias is allocated
across cases to benefit industry by showing that selection on bias is stronger in more important cases,
as proxied by a brokerage firm's financial and reputational stake in a case. The largest brokerage
firms also enjoy substantially more bias than other firms. Meanwhile, selection on expertise is
strongest when cases are more complex (as measured by the number of different types of allegations
made in a case). This is consistent with arbitrator expertise being targeted to cases where it is
most likely to lead to an increase in precision of punishments.
In the second and main part of the analysis, I explore the relationship between self-regulation
and arbitrator selection. I find that selection on bias increases and, in some cases, is only statistically
significant after a rules change that removed NASD control in the selection of arbitrators. These
findings are relatively robust to accounting for time-variation in case characteristics and other
time-trends and endogeneity concerns. This suggests that the NASD is not entirely responsible for
selection on bias and is even consistent with the view that the NASD exercised its influence to reduce
(rather than increase) bias in enforcement. Moreover, I show that selection on expertise decreased
following this event which supports the view that SRO control increases expertise in enforcement.
Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence is more consistent with a view where the NASD makes
enforcement more investor-friendly relative to when investors and broker jointly have more control
over enforcement. One explanation for this evidence is that brokers have comparative advantages
over investors in playing the enforcement game and the NASD serves as an institutional solution
to the public goods problem (for instance, arising from a collective reputation) among brokerage
firms that play this game.
Of course, such a positive assessment of the NASD remains speculative. This is primarily due
to limitations in test design. Given the data that was publicly available and the rules change that
occurred at the NASD, the most informative tests involved the study of arbitrator selection patterns.
While most consider arbitrator selection to be of great importance in the enforcement process, it
still represents only one stage of this process and I cannot rule the possibility that the NASD
induces bias in the other stages. As mentioned in the paper, one example of a stage where this
could occur is in arbitrator list management. The analysis of tenure patterns from section 7.1 does
not establish NASD motives in the management of the arbitrator list.55 Even more importantly,
this paper does not attempt to address the real impact of self-regulation on industry and investor
behavior. Thus, while the hope is that the results in this paper move priors concerning the benefits
and costs of SRO control over enforcement (at least in the case of the NASD), there is substantial
scope for further study on this topic.
Appendix
A. The Rise of Securities Arbitration
Almost all customer brokerage contracts include predispute arbitration agreements. The Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 provides that such a clause to arbitrate future disputes is "valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 56 Yet, despite this
broad statutory mandate, the Supreme Court held in Wilko v. Swan (1953) that claims arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 (SA), which protects investors from fraud in public offerings but not in secondary
market transactions, could not be compelled to arbitration via contract. 57
Specifically, the Court considered the right to recover under the SA to be a "special right", that differed
from the common law rights of recovery and precluded predispute arbitration agreements, because of two
reasons (Heinemann, 1986). First, section 12(a)(2) of the Act placed the burden on the issuer and interme-
diary to prove lack of scienter and provided the investor with a wide choice of venues for resolving disputes.
Second, section 14 stated that "any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision" of the Securities Act was unenforceable. In essence, the
Court believed that compelling arbitration violated the inalienability of the choice of venues provision and
that:
"[the] effectiveness in application (of the Act's provisions) is lessened in arbitration as compared
to judicial proceedings... As [the] award may be made without explanation of [the] reasons and
55In unreported analysis, I have tried to look at a specific aspect of list management that is viewed by investor groups
as highly pro-industry: the inclusion of industry arbitrators on 3-member panels. Using regression discontinuity
techniques that exploit (time-varying) claim thresholds for moving from 1- to 3-member panels, I find that investors
actually do better in cases with industry arbitrators. However, while the results do not seem to be driven by the
endogeneity of claim size, it is difficult to reliably gauge whether they are due to the inclusion of the industry
arbitrator or the presence of an additional public arbitrator.
56See Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9, US Code, Section 1-14 (1925).57See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
without a complete record of [the] proceedings, the arbitrators conception of the legal meaning
of such statutory requirements as 'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact,' cannot
be examined."
It also added that such arbitration agreements should be voided given the investor's bounded rationality
when:
"surrender[ing] one of the advantages the Act... at a time when he is less able to judge the
weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary."
Based on section 27 and 29(a) of the SEA, whose wordings are similar to sections 12(a)(2) and 14 of the
SA, lower courts extended this ruling to Exchange Act claims and, as a result, most investor-broker disputes
were being resolved in public courts.
However, things changed dramatically following the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Shearson v. McMa-
hon (1987) which formally established the enforceability of arbitration agreements for Exchange Act claims.5 8
The Court found that the foundations of the Wilko ruling either did not hold for SEA claims or were no
longer accurate. Regarding choice of venue, it found that:
"... the antiwaiver provision of [section] 29(a) forbids [the] enforcement of agreements to waive
'compliance' with the provisions of the statute. But [section] 27 does not impose any duty with
which persons trading in securities must 'comply.' By its terms, 29(a) only prohibits waiver
of the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act. Because 27 does not impose any
statutory duties, its waiver does not constitute a waiver of 'compliance with any provision' of
the Exchange Act under 29(a)."
Furthermore, on the ineffectiveness of arbitration enforcing investors' statutory rights, it argued that:
"... the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis of the Wilko opinion... is difficult to square
with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time. This is especially so in
light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of securities laws. Even if Wilko's
assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at the time..., most certainly they do not hold true
today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority."
Following this decision, the Wilko doctrine, as it applied to SA claims, was reversed by the Court in Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc. (1989) and, practically overnight, the role of securities
arbitration in enforcement of broker misbehavior had grown exponentially. 59
58See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
59See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Table 1.1: Summary of Case Characteristics
This table reports descriptive statistics of case characteristics in the sample of cases that involve retail investors suing
brokerage firms. Claimi is the monetary value of compensatory damages requested in the case and does not include
amounts requested for interest or attorney fees (winsorized at the 95th percentile). Decisioni is the award-to-claim
ratio for compensatory damages. Punitive1 is a dummy that equals 1 if punitive damages are requested. The dummy
variable PunitiveAwdi equals 1 if any amount of punitive damages are awarded. Employeei is a dummy that equals
1 if a registered representative (individual broker) is included as a respondent in the case. The dummy variable
Expungementi equals 1 if case i is erased from the registered representative's public CRD record. Counterclaimi
equals 1 only if a counterclaim by the respondent includes a request for compensatory damages (rather than just
attorney fees). The length of a case, Length1 , is defined as the period of time (in years) between the case's filing date
and the decision date. The allegation dummies displayed in Panel B are described in Section 3.1.
Distribution
Case Characteristics: N Mean SD 2 5 th 5 0 th 7 5 th
Panel A: Distribution of Case Characteristics
Claimi (dollars) 15,306 239,864 402,840 15,000 73,702 250,000
Decision1  13,913 0.284 0.367 0.000 0.047 0.524
Settlementi 15,975 0.103 0.304
Punitivei 15,983 0.560 0.496
PunitiveAwdi 8,962 0.065 0.246
Dismissali 15,975 0.368 0.482
Representation1  15,983 0.693 0.461
Employeei 15,983 0.746 0.435
Expungementi 11,924 0.200 0.400
Counterclaimi 15,983 0.064 0.245
ThirdParty1  15,983 0.037 0.190
Length1 (yrs) 15,983 1.304 0.722 0.849 1.159 1.567
Panel B: Distribution of Allegations Made in Disputes
Churningi 15,983 0.135 0.342
Unauthorizedi 15,983 0.230 0.421
Misrepresentation1  15,983 0.444 0.497
Omission1  15,983 0.350 0.477
Suitability1  15,983 0.436 0.496
Instructionsi 15,983 0.193 0.395
Supervisioni 15,983 0.298 0.457
Negligencei 15,983 0.468 0.499
Fiduciaryi 15,983 0.460 0.498
Table 1.2: Case Outcomes Regression
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating case outcomes to case characteristics. The listed
characteristics are as defined in Table 1. The number of observations is lower than in Table 1 because information on
hearing location (city) is not available for every case and cityxyears with less than observations are dropped. The
variable In Claims is winsorized at the 95th percentile. A brokerage firm is included in the Repeat Firms subsample
if it is included as a respondent in at least 5 cases in the sample. The Punitive (Employee) subsample consists of all
cases with Punitives (Employeei) equal to 1. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage firm level.
Dependent Variable: Decisioni Dismissals PunitiveAwds Expungementi
Subsample: All Repeat Firms All Punitive Employee
In Claimi -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.020*** 0.002 0.015***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.003 )
Employees 0.025*** -0.007 -0.009 0.020**
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.006 )
Representationi 0.074*** 0.083*** -0.076*** 0.012 -0.014
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.009 )
Counterclaimi -0.021* -0.012 0.012 -0.011 -0.012
( 0.012 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.012 )
ThirdPartyi 0.135*** 0.099*** -0.079*** 0.040** -0.050***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 )
Settlementi 0.176*** 0.136"** 0.411*** -0.053*** 0.625"**
( 0.028 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.016 )
Allegation Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y
City x Year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Brokerage Firm FE? N Y N N N
No. of Firms 1,652 432 1,717 1,265 1,499
R 2  0.107 0.242 0.168 0.126 0.503
N 12,940 11,061 14,459 8,202 10,878
Table 1.3: Summary of Arbitrator Characteristics
This table reports descriptive statistics of arbitrator characteristics in the sample. The measures for pro-industry
bias are: Decisionj, ProIndj, and ProlndfE. Decisionj is arbitrator j's average Decisions. Prolndj is j's average
ProIndi - Outcomet - E[Outcomei] where E[Outcomej] is calculated using the estimates of the first column in Table
2 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. ProlndfE is similarly defined using the estimates from the second
column of Table 2 to obtain ProIndRE. All averages are claim-weighted. Tenurej is equal to the length of time
(in years) between the filing date of the arbitrator's first case and the decision date of his last case. The dummy
Lawyerj equals one if an Esq or JD suffix is attached to the arbitrator's name. Industryj is a dummy equal to one
if the arbitrator is ever listed as an industry arbitrator. In Panel C, the dummy variable RegRepj is equal to 1 if
an industry arbitrator can be identified as a registered representative (i.e., has a public CRD record). The dummy
variable Disciplinej is equal to one if the registered representative has potential disciplinary events listed in his CRD
record. The p-values in Panel D give the significance of tests of the equality of means in the I st and 4 th selection
quartiles. This test allows
freedom.
for different variances across groups and uses the Welch approximation for degrees of
Distribution
Arb. Characteristics: N Mean SD 25t  5 0th 75t
Panel A: All Arbitrators
Selectionsj 7,369 4.963 5.350 2 3 6
Decisionj 7,369 0.239 0.269 0.019 0.145 0.366
ProIndj 7,369 0.004 0.250 -0.111 0.078 0.168
ProIndfE 6,983 0.000 0.230 -0.098 0.055 0.139
Tenurej 7,369 5.439 3.917 1.975 4.534 8.140
Lawyerj 7,369 0.446 0.497
ChairExpj 7,369 0.415 0.493
Industryj 7,369 0.408 0.492
Panel B: Public Arbitrators
Selectionsj 4,359 5.610 6.068 2 4 7
Tenurej 4,359 5.550 3.897 2.159 4.658 8.148
Lawyerj 4,359 0.607 0.489
ChairExpj 4,359 0.632 0.482
Panel C: Industry Arbitrators
Selectionsj 3,010 4.027 3.907 1 3 5
Tenurej 3,010 5.279 3.940 1.707 4.199 8.132
Lawyerj 3,010 0.215 0.411
ChairExpj 3,010 0.100 0.300
RegRepj 3,010 0.410 0.492
Disciplinej 1,233 0.150 0.357
Selection Quartiles
Panel D: All Arbitrators st 2nd 3rd 4 th p-value
Selectionsj 1.442 3.000 4.848 12.309
Decisionj 0.268 0.249 0.222 0.201 <0.001
Prolndj 
-0.009 -0.006 0.012 0.023 <0.001
ProIndR E 
-0.004 -0.018 0.003 0.014 0.007
Lawyer, 0.368 0.446 0.460 0.568 <0.001
ChairExpj 0.202 0.382 0.501 0.709 <0.001
01
Table 1.4: Truncated Negative Binomial Regression on Number of Selections
This table reports coefficient estimates from zero-truncated negative binomial regressions relating the number of
times an arbitrator is selected to panels to arbitrator characteristics. In Nj is the natural log of the number of
cases filed in j's home state during his tenure. Home city is defined as the city where j sits on the majority of his
cases (only coded if this proportion is over 50%). All other variables are as defined in Table 3. The row 25,75
reports the percentage increase in the expected number of selections given a change in the continuous variable
Biasj E {-Decision3 , ProIndj, ProIndfE} from the 25th to 75th percentile holding all other variables at their
means. Similarly, the row OAw er gives the increase following a change in the dummy variable Lawyerj from 0 to
1. Bias indicates the estimated influence of selection on bias on the pro-industriness of a case (described in p.16 of
Section 5.1). Pseudo-R 2 is reported using the relative gain convention (i.e., 1 - L,r/Co) with the unconditional zero-
truncated Poisson regression used as the baseline model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance
at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Public Industry
-0.209*** -0.219***
( 0.040 ) ( 0.039 )
0.126***
(0.021 )
-0.143***
( 0.033 )
-0.191***
( 0.037 )
1.383***
0.133***
(0.020 )
-0.144***
(0.034 )
-0.194***
(0.038 )
1
0.157***
( 0.034 )
0.133***
( 0.020 )
-0.144***
( 0.034 )
-0.193***
(0.038 )
1
0.072*
(0.037 )
0.134***
( 0.021 )
-0.149***
(0.033 )
-0.186***
(0.038 )
1
0.095*
(0.052 )
0.191***
(0.024 )
1
0.031
(0.070 )
-0.009
( 0.026 )
-0.182***
(0.031)
1
( . ) - - - -
Home City FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constraint on Nj? N Y Y Y Y Y
25 75 7.5 7.8 4.5 1.7 2.2 0.7
ALawyerj 13.5 14.2 14.2 14.3 21.1 -0.9D
Bias 3.6 3.8 2.3 1.0 1.3 0.4
Pseudo-R 2  0.449 0.447 0.447 0.437 0.454 0.384
N 7,008 7,008 7,008 6,650 3,965 2,685
Subsample:
Selectionsj
Decisionj
ProInd3
ProIndFEj
Lawyerj
RegRepj
Industryj
In Nj
Table 1.5: Determinants of Arbitrator Selection: Is There Selection on Bias and Expertise?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions with case fixed-effects that relate the selection of
arbitrators in individual cases to arbitrator characteristics. Prolndj, ProIndF E, and Lawyerj are as defined in
Table 3. ChairExperienceij is a dummy that equals 1 if arbitrator j has had experience as a chairperson prior to
case i's filing. CaseExperienceij denotes the fraction of case i's allegations that have also been alleged in at least
one of j's previous cases. Lengthj is the average length of time (in years) needed to resolve cases that j is selected
to. Tenureij equals the length of time (in years) between the arbitrator's first selection and the filing date of case
i. Panel1 j is a dummy variable that equals one if the arbitrator is sitting on another case on i's filing date. As in
Table 4, A25,75 reports the percentage increase in the expected number of selections given a change in the variable z
from the 25 th to the 75th percentile (similar notation in the case of dummy variables). Standard errors are clustered
at the home cityxyear level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, **, and
, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Selectedij
Subsample: Public Industry
Prolndj 0.186*** 0.185***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.047 )
ProInd'E 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.046 0.053
( 0.047 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.070 )
Lawyerj 0.266*** 0.264**" 0.028
( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.032 )
ChairExperienceij 0.381*** 0.380*** 0.347***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.061 )
CaseExperienceij 0.524*** 0.434*** 0.514*** 0.424*** 0.423*** 0.408***
( 0.047 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.050 )
Lengthj -0.333*** -0.322*** -0.312** -0.301*** -0.192*** -0.180"**
( 0.032 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 )
Tenureij 0.028*** 0.014"*** 0.026*** 0.012*** 0.015** 0.010*
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
Panelij 0.242*** 0.175*** 0.250*** 0.184*** 0.070 0.051
( 0.046 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 )
25,75 5.4 5.4 3.1 3.3 1.1 1.3
Awyer/ChairExperiene 30.5 46.4 30.3 46.3 2.9 41.4
A2aseExperience 48.1 38.5 47.0 37.4 40.2 38.6
Pseudo-R2  0.010 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.005
Noba 1,110,283 1,110,283 1,086,115 1,086,115 401,900 401,900
Ncases 9,983 9,983 9,963 9,963 5,376 5,376
Table 1.6: The Determinants of Arbitrator Selection: How Do Selection on Bias and Expertise
Vary Across Cases?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions with case fixed-effects that relate the selection of
arbitrators in individual cases to arbitrator characteristics across different levels of case importance and complexity.
I' and I? denote interaction terms (which differ across columns). The interaction terms used are LargeBroki,
HiClaimi, Supervisioni, Employee1 , ManyClaimsi, and MargLevi. Supervisioni and Employeei are as defined
in Table 3. LargeBroki is a dummy that equals 1 if a brokerage firm is listed among the Top 10 employers of retail
brokers in the SIA Yearbooks in over 80% of the years from 1990-91 to 2004-05 (see Footnote 31 on p.19). The
dummy variable HiClaimi is set to 1 if Claimi is greater than or equal to its 75th percentile value. ManyClaimsi is
a dummy that equals 1 if the number of allegations in a case is greater than 3. MargLevi is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if a case involves transactions that include the use of margin or leverage. All other variables are as defined in
Table 5. To conserve space, the coefficients on Lengthj, Tenureij, and Panelij are not displayed in the table (they
are qualitatively identical to those in Table 5). As in the previous two tables, A25,75 reports the percentage increase
in the expected number of selections given a change in the variable z from the 2 5th to the 75 th percentile (similar
notation in the case of dummy variables). These economic effects depend on the interaction term's value. Since all
interactions are dummy variables, the economic effects for If equal to 0 and 1 are both reported. Standard errors
are clustered at the home city xyear level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted
by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
Sorting On:
Interactions:
ProIndFE
IA x ProlndfFE
I? x ProIndjE'
I 1 x I4 x ProlndFE
ChairExperienceij
Ij x ChairExperiencej
CaseExperienceij
Ii x CaseExperienceij
Selectedij
Public
I' = LargeBroki
I = -
0.054
(0.055 )
0.251**
( 0.100 )
0.425***
( 0.038 )
-0.137***
(0.040 )
0.421"**
(0.051)
0.007
Case Importance
HiClaimi Supervision1
- -
0.077 0.108**
( 0.053 ) ( 0.053 )
0.202* 0.099
( 0.103 ) ( 0.099 )
0.436***
(0.037 )
-0.221***
(0.046 )
0.440***
(0.049 )
-0.004
0.461"**
(0.040 )
-0.271***
(0.043 )
0.413**"
(0.045 )
0.051
Employeei
LargeBroki
-0.142
(0.112 )
0.251**
(0.124 )
0.535***
(0.203 )
-0.365*
( 0.217 )
Case Complexity
ManyClaimsi MargLev,
0.087 0.097**
( 0.072 ) ( 0.049 )
0.083 0.279**
( 0.088 ) ( 0.128 )
0.380*** 0.562***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.049 )
-0.309***
(0.044 )
0.424*** 0.342***
( 0.042 ) ( 0.051 )
0.184***
0.377***
(0.036 )
0.019
(0.051 )
0.407**"
(0.043 )
0.119
( 0.072 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.089 )
If Il = 0:
A25,a 1.3 1.8 2.6 2.1 2.3
AChairExperience 53.0 54.7 58.6 - 75.3 45.8
A25,aExperience 37.1 39.0 36.3 29.3 35.7
If I = 1:
25Bias 7.4 6.8 5.0 4.1 9.2
AChairExperience 33.5 24.0 21.0 28.8 48.70,1
25CaeEperience 37.8 38.6 41.7 48.4 48.3
Pseudo-R2  0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011
Nobs 1,086,115 1,039,764 1,086,115 1,086,115 1,086,115 1,086,115
Ncases 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963
Table 1.7: Case Outcomes Regression: Before and After the NLSS Rules Change
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating case outcomes (Decisioni) to case characteristics.
The listed characteristics are as defined in Table 1. The number of observations is lower than in Table 1 because
information on hearing location is not available for every case. The variable In Claim1 is winsorized at the 95th
percentile. PostNLSSi is a dummy that equal to 1 after the change in selection procedures. A brokerage firm is
included in the Repeat Firms subsample if it is included as a respondent in at least 5 cases in the sample.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
PostNLSSi
Trendi
Trendi x PostNLSSi
In Claimi
Employeei
Representationi
Counterclaimi
ThirdPartyi
Settlement1
All
-0.058***
(0.013 )
-0.040"**
(0.003 )
0.026***
(0.009 )
0.076***
(0.009 )
-0.022*
( 0.012 )
0.136"**
(0.021 )
0.178***
(0.029 )
Decisioni
Repeat Firms
-0.017**
( 0.008 )
-0.040***
(0.004 )
-0.008
(0.008 )
0.086"**
(0.010 )
-0.015
( 0.012 )
0.101"**
(0.023 )
0.144***
( 0.035 )
0.006"**
(0.003 )
-0.030***
( 0.006 )
-0.041***
(0.003 )
0.025***
( 0.010 )
0.076***(0.008 )
-0.026**
( 0,012 )
0.136"**
(0.021 )
0.178***
( 0.029 )
-0.051"**
( 0.021 )
0.010"**
(0.003)
-0.026***
( 0.006 )
-0.040***
(0.003 )
0.024***
(0.009 )
0.076"**
( 0.008 )
-0.025**
( 0.012 )
0.136"**
( 0.021)
0.180**
( 0.029 )
Claim Type Dummies? Y Y Y Y
City FE? Y Y Y Y
Brokerage Firm FE? N Y N N
No. of Firms 1,652 432 1,652 1,652
R 2  0.066 0.208 0.069 0.070
N 12,940 11,061 12,940 12,940
Table 1.8: Arbitrator Selection Patterns Before and After the NLSS Rules Change: How Do
Selection on Bias and Expertise Change?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions with case fixed-effects that relate the selection of
arbitrators in individual cases to arbitrator characteristics before and after the NLSS rules change. PostNLSSi
is a dummy that equal to 1 after the change in selection procedures. All other variables are as defined in Table
5. To conserve space, the coefficients on Lengthj, Tenureij, and Panelij are not displayed in the table (they are
qualitatively identical to those in Table 5). As in the previous three tables, A25,75 reports the percentage increase
in the expected number of selections given a change in the variable z from the 25th to the 7 5th percentile (similar
notation in the case of dummy variables). These economic effects are different in the pre- and post-NLSS periods and
are reported separately. Standard errors are clustered at the home cityxyear level. Significance at the 10-percent,
5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
Prolndj
PostNLSSi x Prolndj
ProIndFE
PostNLSSi x ProIndf E
Lawyerj
PostNLSSi x Lawyerj
ChairExperiencej
PostNLSSi x ChairExperiencej
CaseExperiencej
PostNLSSi x CaseExperiencej
Selectedij
Public
0.117*
(0.063 )
0.182*
(0.093 )
0.119*
(0.064 )
0.174*
( 0.095 )
0.057
( 0.061 )
0.193**
(0.094 )
0.366***
(0.036 )
-0.232***
(0.048 )
0.369***
(0.036 )
-0.237***
( 0.048 )
0.798***
( 0.058 )
-0.789***
(0.084 )
0.592***
(0.033 )
-0.563***
(0.048 )
0.607***
(0.053 )
-0.533***
(0.075 )
0.782***
( 0.058 )
-0.774***
(0.084 )
0.098
( 0.060 )
0.145
(0.094 )
0.591"**
(0.033 )
-0.564***
(0.047)
0.592"**
( 0.053 )
-0.518**
(0.075 )
Pre-NLSS:
AP,7M  3.3 3.4 1.3 2.3
ALawyer/ChairExperience 44.7 80.7 44.1 80.5
A5dasExperience 81.9 57.6 79.8 55.9
Post-NLSS:
ABias 8.8 8.6 6.0 5.9
ALawyer/ChairExperience 14.2 3.0 14.3 2.7
Aa seExperience 0.7 5.6 0.6 5.7
Pseudo-R2  0.012 0.015 0.012 0.015
Nobs 1,110,283 1,110,283 1,086,115 1,086,115
Ncases 9,983 9,983 9,983 9,983
Table 1.9: Determinants of Professional Representation: Do Investors Rely More on Lawyers After
the NLSS Rules Change?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions relating the use of professional representation by
investors to case characteristics before and after the NLSS change. Trendi is a variable that measures the difference
between the filing date of case i and the NLSS implementation date. It is negative for cases filed prior to the rules
change and positive for those filed after the rules change. ThreeMemberi is a dummy variable that equals one if an
arbitration panel is composed of three arbitrators. All other variables are as defined in previous tables. Time fixed-
effects are excluded because of collinearity with PostNLSSi and Trendi. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent,
and 1-percent level are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Representationi
Subsample:
PostNLSSi 0.253***
0.052
Trendi
Trendi x PostNLSSi
In Claimi
Employeei
ThreeMemberi
0.488***
0.023
0.221**
0.053
0.878***
0.070
0.009
0.011
0.089***
0.025
0.476***
0.023
0.226***
0.053
0.915"**
0.070
3-Member
0.051
0.069
0.418"**
0.027
0.214***
0.074
1-Member
0.385***
0.083
0.018
0.015
0.004
0.035
0.407***
0.027
0.216"**
0.074
0.681"**
0.046
0.165"*
0.081
0.008
0.018
0.119***
0.041
0.678***
0.045
0.172**
0.081
Allegation Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
City FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pseudo-R2  0.331 0.333 0.121 0.122 0.220 0.223
N 14,767 14,767 10,288 10,288 4,462 4,462
Table 1.10: Summary of Case Characteristics: Means Before and After the NLSS Rules Change
This table reports descriptive statistics of case characteristics before and after the NLSS rules change. For each
subperiod, averages are computed for cases with 3-member arbitration panels. For Claimi the subsample is further
restricted to cases with claim sizes exceeding the current threshold for moving from 1- to 3-member panels (50,000
dollars). The listed case characteristics are as defined in Table 1.
Subperiod
Case Characteristics: Pre-NLSS Post-NLSS
Claimi (dollars) 356,121 496,212
LargeBroki 0.339 0.454
Employee1  0.709 0.701
Churning1  0.168 0.150
Unauthorizedi 0.227 0.184
Misrepresentationi 0.486 0.439
Omissioni 0.363 0.346
Suitability1  0.437 0.449
Mismanagementi  0.106 0.063
Instructionsi 0.188 0.121
Supervision1  0.233 0.423
Negligencei 0.407 0.617
Fiduciaryi 0.400 0.638
Table 1.11: Selection on Bias Across Cases Before and After the NLSS Rules Change: Does Time-
Variation in Case Characteristics Explain the Increase in Selection on Bias?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions with case fixed-effects that relate the selection of
arbitrators in individual cases to arbitrator characteristics before and after the NLSS rules change across different case
importance levels. PreNLSSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 before the NLSS switch and PostNLSSi is as defined
in Table 7. HiClaimi, LargeBroki, and Supervisioni are as defined in Table 6. The dummy variables LoClaimi,
SmallBroki, and NoSuperi equal 1 if HiClaimi, LargeBroki, and Supervisioni are zero, respectively. In Model la
(lb), the specification is identical to the third (fourth) column of Table 8 with the exception that the selection on bias
coefficient is estimated for four groups: PreNLSSi x LoClaimi, PreNLSSi x HiClaimi, PostNLSSi x LoClaimi,
and PostNLSSi x HiClaimi (all interacted with ProInd E). Models 2a (2b) and 3a (3b) are identical to Model la
(lb) except that they sort on case importance using broker size (LargeBroki) and the failure to supervise employees
(Supervisioni), respectively. Only the four coefficients on selection on bias are reported from these regressions.
Standard errors are clustered at the home cityxyear level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent
level are denoted by *, ", and **, respectively.
Model la Model 2a Model 3a
Group: LoClaimi HiClaimi SmallBroki LargeBroki NoSuperi Supervisioni
PreNLSSi 0.010 0.398*** 0.063 0.318**" 0.103 0.178
( 0.074 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.112 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.120 )
PostNLSSi 0.009 0.704*** 0.185** 0.409*** 0.192** 0.385***
( 0.094 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.109 )
Abias,preA25,75 0.3 11.9 1.5 7.8 2.4 4.3
25,75ost 0.3 22.0 4.4 10.1 4.6 9.5
p-value 0.991 0.047 0.267 0.565 0.428 0.208
Model lb Model 2b Model 3b
Group: LoClaimi HiClaimi SmallBroki  LargeBroki NoSuperi Supervisioni
PreNLSSi 0.028 0.182* 0.049 0.153 0.056 0.128
( 0.069 ) ( 0.107 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.118 )
PostNLSSi 0.092 0.440*** 0.123 0.384*** 0.199** 0.269**
( 0.092 ) ( 0.126 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.116 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.119 )
Abias,pre
s25,75 0.7 4.4 1.2 3.7 1.3 3.1
25,75ot 2.2 10.9 2.9 9.4 4.8 6.5
p-value 0.585 0.119 0.509 0.152 0.188 0.403
Table 1.12: Regression of Panel Bias on Pro-Industriness of Case Outcomes
This table reports coefficient estimates from least squares regressions relating the pro-industriness of case outcomes to
measures of panel bias. For case i, panel bias measures, ProIndPanj and ProIndPantfE, are obtained by computing
arbitrator bias measures as in Table 3 but with case i omitted and then taking the average over arbitrators on
the panel with Selectionsj greater than or equal to 2. Similarly, ProlndPubj (ProIndPubfE) and ProIndIndi
(ProIndIndfE) take corresponding averages over the public and industry arbitrators only. Standard errors are
clustered at the brokerage firm level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
ProIndPani
PostNLSSi x ProIndPani
ProlndPubi
Prolndi ProIndfE
All CasesAll Cases
0.136*** 0.176***
( 0.022 ) ( 0.030 )
-0.091*
(0.051 )
0.142***
(0.024 )
0.032
(0.021 )
ProlndIndi
ProIndPanFE 0.127*** 0.144***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.034 )
-0.037
(0.046 )
PostNLSSi x ProIndPan1E
ProlndPubFE
ProIndIndFE
(0.023 )
R2  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
N 12,401 12,401 7,462 10,588 10,588 6,201
0.103***
(0.023 )
0.037
Table 1.13: Regression of Panel Bias on Pro-Industriness of Case Outcomes for Repeated Cases
This table reports coefficient estimates from least squares regressions relating the pro-industriness of case outcomes
to measures of panel bias as in Table 12 but only for the subsample of Grubman cases and repeated cases. A
case is classified as a Grubman case if it involves an investor suing Citigroup and the analyst Jack Grubman for
misrepresentations in Worldcom analyst reports. The repeated case subsample is as described on page 49. Standard
errors are clustered at the brokerage firm level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ProIndi ProIndFE ProIndi ProIndFE
Subsample: Grubman Cases All Repeated
ProIndPani 0.325** 0.339**
( 0.161 ) ( 0.148 )
ProIndPanF E 0.313* 0.332*
( 0.186 ) ( 0.172 )
R2  0.031 0.022 0.150 0.102
N 131 128 186 183
Table 1.14: Regression of Pro-Industriness of Case Outcomes on Panel Bias and Bias of Dropped
Arbitrators
This table reports coefficient estimates from least squares regressions relating the pro-industriness of case outcomes
to measures of panel bias and the bias of a dropped arbitrator. For case i, panel bias measures, ProlndPanj and
ProIndPanfE, are obtained as in Table 12. ProIndDropi and ProIndDropFE are the bias measures for the dropped
arbitrator. Regressions are run on the subsample of cases where an arbitrator drops from the original panel due to
illness, accident or death and is identified by name in the award document. Standard errors are clustered at the
brokerage firm level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, and ***,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: ProInd1  ProIndFE
Subsample: Dropped Arbitrator Dropped Arbitrator
ProIndPani 0.313
(0.295 )
ProIndDropi -0.140
(0.226 )
ProIndPan FE 0.139
(0.462 )
ProIndDrop FE -0.124
( 0.186 )
R 2  0.037 0.013
N 46 40
Table 1.15: Do the Bias Measures Predict Dissent Probabilities?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions relating dissent to arbitration panel characteristics.
The variable DispProIndi measures the difference in the bias of arbitrators within the panel and is defined as the
difference between the lowest and highest ProIndj of arbitrators on the panel (with Selectionsj greater than or
equal to 2). DispProIndFE is similarly defined. The variables DispProIndLarge1 and DispProlndLarge'E are
dummy variables equal to 1 if the values of DispProIndi and DispProIndFE are above the 9 0 th percentiles of
their respective distributions. ProInd? and (ProIndfE)2 measure how different case i's outcome is from the typical
outcome of observationally similar cases. AvgLawyeri (AvgChairExperiencei) is equal to the fraction of arbitrators
on case i's panel that are lawyers (have past experience as a chairperson). AvgCaseExperiencei is defined similarly.
All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage firm level. Significance
at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, *, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
DispProIndi
DispProIndLarge1
Dissenti
All Cases
1.368***
(0.462 )
0.583***
(0.224 )
DispProlndRE 1.343**
(0.571 )
DispProIndLargeiE
ProInd?
(ProlndfE)2
AvgLawyeri
AvgChairExperiencei
AvgCaseExperiencei
In Claimi
Employeei
Counterclaimi
ThirdPartyi
Allegation Dummies?
City and Year Dummies?
-0.854*
(0.516 )
0.639**
(0.279 )
0.005
(0.280 )
-0.161
(0.248 )
0.200***
( 0.063 )
-0.376**
(0.152 )
-0.257
(0.263 )
0.209
(0.331 )
Y
Y
-0.682
(0.513 )
0.635**
(0.275 )
0.004
(0.280 )
-0.154
(0.248 )
0.171"**
( 0.058 )
-0.372**
(0.151)
-0.251
(0.263 )
0.212
(0.331)
Y
Y
-0.001
(0.528 )
0.623**
(0.282 )
-0.062
( 0.296 )
-0.079
(0.260 )
0.203***
( 0.066 )
-0.420***
(0.157 )
-0.243
(0.283 )
0.354
(0.340 )
Y
Y
0.677***
( 0.229 )
0.100
(0.498 )
0,.620**
(0.280 )
-0.073
(0.291)
-0.080
( 0.258 )
0.177***
( 0.062 )
-0.418"**
( 0.156 )
-0.240
(0.280 )
0.337
( 0.335 )
Y
Y
Pseudo-R2  0.068 0.066 0.070 0.070
N 7,744 7,744 6,588 6,588
~------
Table 1.16: Do the Expertise Measures Predict Selection as a Chairperson?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions with case fixed-effects that relate selection as a
chairperson in individual cases to arbitrator characteristics. The dependent variable, Chairpersonij, equals one if
arbitrator j is selected as the chairperson to case i. All other variables are as defined in previous tables. Standard
errors are clustered at the brokerage firm level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are
denoted by **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
Lawyerj
Chairpersonij
1.827***
(0.073 )
ChairExperienceij
CaseExperienceij
Prolndj
ProlndlFE
Tenureij
Industryj
Aexpert
01
Pseudo-R2
Nobs
Ncase,
-0.026
(0.170 )
0.105***
(0.013 )
-2.053"**
(0.067 )
521.3
0.441
11,108
4,424
1.854***
(0.071)
-0.205
(0.176 )
0.026**
(0.012 )
-1.796***
(0.069 )
538.6
0.452
11,108
4,424
All Selected Arbitrators
1.831***
( 0.072 )
1.857**"
(0.073 )
0.570***
(0.085 )
-0.077
(0.159 )
0.077***
( 0.013 )
-2.541***
(0.069 )
57.7
0.316
11,108
4,424
0.018
(0.185 )
0.106***
( 0.014 )
-2.050***
(0.068 )
524.1
0.442
11,010
4,394
0.024
(0.178 )
0.025**
(0.012 )
-1.797***
(0.069 )
540.5
0.452
11,010
4,394
0.579***
(0.086 )
0.008
(0.174 )
0.076***
( 0.013 )
-2.541**"
(0.070 )
58.9
0.316
11,010
4,394
Table 1.17: Do the Bias Measures Predict Settlement Probabilities?
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions relating observed settlement to arbitration panel
characteristics. The panel bias measures, AvgProlndi and AvgProlndfE, are as defined in Table 11. AvgLawyeri
and AvgChairExperienceij are as defined in Table 13. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard errors
are clustered at the brokerage firm level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted
by *, *, and *"*, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
ProlndPani
ProlndPanE
AvgLawyer1
AvgChairExperienceij
AvgCaseExperienceij
In Claim1
Employeei
Counterclaimi
ThirdPartyi
Settlementi
All
0.136
( 0.210 )
-0.010
(0.139 )
-0.331"**
( 0.108 )
-0.640***
( 0.116 )
0.179**"
( 0.037 )
1.490***
(0.234 )
0.088
(0.167 )
-0.062
3-Member
0.085
(0.343 )
0.002
( 0.162 )
-0.226**
( 0.108 )
-0.785"**
(0.119 )
-0.016
(0.036 )
1.507"**
(0.222 )
0.131
(0.175 )
0.012
All
0.047
(0.216 )
-0.012
(0.139 )
-0.328***
( 0.108 )
-0.637***
(0.117 )
0.181***
( 0.037 )
1.500***
(0.233 )
0.087
(0.168 )
-0.063
3-Member
-0.122
(0.317)
0.003
( 0.161 )
-0.225**
( 0.108 )
-0.786***
(0.119 )
-0.016
(0.037)
1.508***
(0.220 )
0.128
(0.175 )
0.012
( 0.231 ) ( 0.244 ) ( 0.231 ) ( 0.244 )
Allegation Dummies? Y Y Y Y
City and Year Dummies? Y Y Y Y
Pseudo-R2  0.287 0.261 0.287 0.261
N 14,132 9,688 14,106 9,681
Settlement•-~---
Table 1.18: The Determinants of Arbitrator Tenure
This table reports coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions relating arbitrator tenure to other
arbitrator characteristics. Arbitrators whose tenure windows end in the last year of the sample are classified as having
right-censored tenures. The dependent variable, Tenurej, is as defined in Table 3. ProIndj, ProIndFE, Lawyerj
and RegRepj are also as defined in Table 3. PostNLSSi is as defined in Table 7. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Subsample:
ProIndj
PostNLSSi x Prolndj
ProlndF E
PostNLSSi x Prolndf E
Lawyerj
Tenure3
Public
-0.318*** -0.327***
( 0.076 ) ( 0.085 )
0.086
(0.429)
-0.265** -0.284**
( 0.123 ) ( 0.130 )
0.163
( 0.427 )
-0.342*** -0.342*** -0.338*** -0.338***
( 0.083 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.079 )
RegRepj
Industry
-0.388*** -0.372***
( 0.114 ) ( 0.132 )
-0.142
(0.594 )
-0.176* -0.176*
( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 )
-0.254*** -0.254***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
Home State FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Censoring? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Censored Obs 2,160 2,160 2,107 2,107 1,321 1,321
Log-likelihood -17,009.97 -17,009.92 -16,252.04 -16,251.93 -11,205.36 -11,205.29
N 4,366 4,366 4,223 4,223 2,856 2,856
Public
Table 1.19: Selection on Bias Before and After the NLSS Rules Change: Alternative Bias Measures
This table reproduces the conditional logit regressions from Table 8 using alternative measures for arbitrator bias.
The equal- and In Claimi-weighted bias measures are constructed using the same residuals as the earlier bias measures
but with different weights as implied by their names. The semi-parametric bias measure is obtained using claim-size
weights and residuals from a semi-parametric regression with respect to claim-size. The tobit bias measure is obtained
using residuals from a tobit regression with the dependent variable censored below 0 and above 1. In panel A, the
expertise measure used in the specifications is Lawyerj. In panel B, the expertise measure used in the specifications
is ChairExperienceij. Only the coefficients needed to calculate selection on bias are reported. Standard errors are
clustered at the home cityxyear level. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent level are denoted by
*, *, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Lawyerj
Prolndj ProIndE
Independent Variable: ProIndj PostNLSSi x Prond PostNLSSnd
Equal-weigthed -0.032 0.282**" -0.022 0.237***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.089 )
In Claimi-weighted -0.019 0.283*** -0.016 0.244***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.092 )
Semi-parametric 0.076 0.191** 0.035 0.192"*
( 0.063 ) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.094 )
Tobit 0.026 0.119*** 0.024 0.105***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.039 )
Panel B: ChairExperienceij
ProIndj ProIndfE
Independent Variable: ProIndj PostNLSSi x ProIndj ProInd~E PostNLSSi x ProIndjE
Equal-weigthed -0.004 0.243*** 0.017 0.187**
( 0.060 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.088 )
In Claims-weighted 0.006 0.247*** -0.023 0.242***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.092 )
Semi-parametric 0.083 0.178* 0.079 0.141
( 0.064 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.094 )
Tobit 0.030 0.110*" 0.037 0.085**
( 0.027 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.038 )
Figure 1-1: Percentage of Investors with Professional Representation
This figure plots the fraction of cases with three- and one-member panels where the investor hires professional
representation over various years (using filing dates from 1991 to 2003). The solid line represents three-member
panels and the dashed line represents one-member panels.
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Figure 1-2: Mean and Median Claim Sizes
This figure plots the mean and median claim size of cases over various years (using filing dates from 1991 to 2003).
The solid line represents mean claim sizes and the dashed line represents medians.
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Figure 1-3: Coefficients on Bias Measures Before and After the NLSS Switch
This figure plots the coefficients on bias, 3t,t+,, from the fixed-effects logistic regressions as in Table 5 but only using
selections data from year t to t + 1 (relative to the NLSS switch date).
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Figure 1-4: Coefficients on Expertise Measures Before and After the NLSS Switch
This figure plots the coefficients on expertise, ft,t+l, from the fixed-effects logistic regressions as in Table 5 but only
using selections data from year t to t + 1 (relative to the NLSS switch date).
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Chapter 2
Financial Relationships and the
Limits to Arbitrage
Having worked at a major Wall Street bank, [John Meriwether] felt that investment banks were
rife with leaks and couldn't be trusted not to swipe his trades for themselves.
- Lowenstein (Ch. 3, 2000)
Because they act as a gateway to the entire range of services investment banks offer, prime bro-
kers gain access to privileged market-sensitive information from their clients - information that
must be kept from other clients and from the investment bank's proprietary trading departments.
- Financial Times1
2.1 Introduction
Arbitrageurs rely on investment banks for a substantial portion of their financing. However,
when accessing this source of finance, they also run the risk of being expropriated through activities
such as front-running. So why do they use this source of funding instead of other forms of external
finance? First, we argue that investment banks face less severe adverse selection problems. Namely,
they are a type of informable financier because arbitrageurs can reveal their private information to
them. Second, a bank's reputation can also allow it to credibly commit to not exploit arbitrageurs
"'Hustling for the Hedge Funds Dollar," Financial Times, July 14, 2003.
because she values her financial relationships with them. However, this commitment is limited.
This paper studies the role of financial relationships in enabling informable finance and proposes a
new foundation for the limits to arbitrage.
Using a stochastic repeated game that arises from time-variation in mispricing, we develop fur-
ther predictions about when arbitrage becomes limited. Namely, we show that limited arbitrage
occurs at times when mispricing is most severe. This observation cannot be obtained from standard
repeated game models and is robust to realistic assumptions about contractibility. We also demon-
strate that, under certain conditions, our limits to arbitrage problem becomes more substantial as
competition increases between investment banks in attracting business from arbitrageurs and, sur-
prisingly, as arbitrageur wealth increases. This last finding can partially explain why arbitrageurs
occasionally choose to refuse additional capital from desirable institutional investors.
Existing models of limited arbitrage typically introduce a source of non-fundamental risk and
conclude that arbitrage opportunities are risky investments (e.g., De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer-
Vishny (1997)). In these settings, arbitrageurs are reluctant to trade aggressively against mispricing
out of fear that it will worsen and lead them to liquidate their positions at a loss. This is motivated
by two assumptions: arbitrageurs are subject to financial constraints and potential capital providers
cannot understand the arbitrageur's investment opportunities. The latter assumption is called the
"separation of brains and capital."
Yet, the view that all potential financiers cannot understand the arbitrageurs' strategies is
extreme. Though arbitrageurs have significantly more expertise than the typical investor, some
knowledgeable providers of capital have the experience and skill required to adequately evaluate
their opportunities. For instance, investment banks gain similar expertise through proprietary
trading while also funding arbitrageurs through prime brokerage operations. In the presence of
such informable finance, one might think that arbitrage would not be limited. Regardless of recent
performance, arbitrageurs could exploit new opportunities by simply revealing their strategies to
banks and then borrowing funds or getting them to reduce margin requirements.
However, this logic is flawed. Since courts, like most investors, cannot understand the content
of communication between the two parties, contracts are incomplete and banks cannot commit
through formal contracts to provide any capital ex-post. Moreover, the experience that allows
banks to understand the arbitrageurs also gives them access to similar, if not superior, financial
technology to execute these strategies. This creates a hold-up problem. After the arbitrageur reveals
his information to the bank, what prevents the latter from providing no capital and undertaking
the profitable transactions for herself? 2
In a one-shot transaction, the answer is nothing. Banks do not lose anything when holding
up arbitrageurs and therefore cannot credibly commit to making arbitrageurs better off when they
reveal their strategies. Arbitrageurs understand this and refuse to share information with them.
Given this decision, their only resort is to seek financing from the uninformed (a la Shleifer-Vishny).
The separation of brains and capital arises endogenously.
However, when similar interactions occur repeatedly, a bank's concern for its reputation can
persuade the arbitrageur to reveal his information. We consider a sequence of arbitrageurs, each
with knowledge of a different arbitrage opportunity, who interact with infinitely lived banks. In
equilibrium, arbitrageurs and banks optimally collude whenever the latter can commit to acceptable
behavior. Specifically, arbitrageurs reveal their information and allow banks to keep some profits
for themselves in such a way that total surplus is maximized.
Nevertheless, the power of financial relationships as a disciplinary mechanism is limited. The
value of relationships is proportional to the average profitability of an arbitrage opportunity whereas
a bank's profits from fully expropriating the arbitrageur varies with the current level of mispricing.
If the most profitable arbitrages are sufficiently superior to the average one, banks won't always
be able to commit to cooperation. This problem occurs exactly when mispricing is largest and
communication would create the largest surplus between the two parties.
In addition to the limits to arbitrage literature, our paper is also related to several other strands
of finance. First, it provides an additional example where some investors can take advantage of
others through knowledge of their proprietary strategies and trading needs. This is related to the
work of Brunnermeier-Pedersen (2004) who study predatory trading in response to the predictable
activity of large investors. Ko (2002) considers front-running by banks as a cost to arbitrageurs
in disclosing their risk profiles and shows that this can lead to endogenous concentrations of risk.
His analysis differs from ours because it is static and relies on assumptions that arbitrageurs'
strategies are risky and banks are risk-averse. Finally, our work is also related to the theoretical
literature on the efficiency benefits of institutional reputation in finance (e.g., Sharpe (1990), and
2More precisely, as alluded to earlier in the Financial Times quote, information provided by the arbitrageur to the
bank's prime brokerage division can be leaked to the firm's proprietary traders.
Chemmanur-Fulghieri (1994a, 1994b)). 3
This paper is also closely related to the general setting of financing innovation and selling ideas
when intellectual property rights are imperfect. Because of informational asymmetries, potential
financiers and buyers are unlikely to offer a fair price for valuable innovations and good ideas unless
details are provided to them ex-ante. However, once they have this knowledge, they may effectively
own all its productive use and have little incentive to pay for it ex-post. This hold-up problem,
which is identical to ours, is known as the fundamental paradox (Arrow (Ch. 6, 1971)).
There is a large literature that explores ways of mitigating this problem. Anton-Yao (1994)
show that the existence of competition among potential buyers can improve efficiency because the
entrepreneur can threaten to reveal his idea to a competitor. Rajan-Zingales (2001) study how
organizational hierarchy can be used to minimize the problem of information leakage. Rather than
looking at commitment, Anton-Yao (2002, 2004) explore the use of partially expropriable disclosures
to signal project value. Nevertheless, none of these models achieve the first-best. In independent
work, Hellman-Perotti (2005) show that firm reputation can foster more efficient innovation. A
reinterpretation of our model adds to their observation by remarking that the reputation mechanism
is limited in a particular way: it fails to achieve first-best implementation in the most valuable cases.
This paper has two main contributions. First, it provides new economic foundations for the
limits to arbitrage: fear of opportunism by informable financiers. This complements existing theory
by identifying conditions under which the separation of brains and capital would endogenously arise.
The second contribution is broader. Namely, this paper is one of the first to explicitly incorporate
the notion of financial relationships in the asset pricing and microstructure literature. Other work
includes Benabou-Laroque (1992), Desgranges-Foucault (2002), and Bernhardt et al. (2004). The
observation that trade and financial interaction among agents, especially large institutions, is not
anonymous is obvious, yet its effect on pricing has remained largely unexplored. It would be
interesting to investigate how this aspect of trade ameliorates or worsens informational asymmetries
and incentive problems in financial markets. Such analysis could also lead to a better understanding
of the existing institutional structure of the securities industry. We open a discussion on the
market structure of arbitrage later in this paper by commenting on the role that certain arbitrage
3Our model is also similar to Rotemberg-Saloner (1986) who study a stochastically repeated game with i.i.d.
variation. However, all the strategic players in their setting are homogeneous while we assume heterogeneity between
the arbitrageur and the bank in the form of initial information asymmetry.
institutions, like fund-of-funds and seeders, play in overcoming our hold-up problem.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its assump-
tions. Section 3 derives a characterization of the equilibria and their general properties. Section 4
considers a simple refinement based on the degree of banking competition and presents examples
of its implication on limited arbitrage. Additional extensions and discussion are in section 5. All
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
We consider a parsimonious framework where arbitrage opportunities are riskless and converge
immediately following a round of trading. An arbitrage opportunity is modeled as an extensive
form game where initial mispricing is generated at t = 0, relational interactions between the
arbitrageur and the investment bank (bank) occur at t = 1, one round of trading takes place at
t = 2, and terminal payoffs are realized at t = 3. In this section, all variables, including trading
profits, are observable but not verifiable. We relax this assumption in section 5.1 and show that our
results remain largely unaffected by contracting if we allow for adverse selection. We study both
the one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of this game. The stage game in the latter version is
called an arbitrage opportunity cycle.
There are N risky assets in the economy and a riskless asset with a rate of return normalized
to 0. All agents have a common prior over the terminal payoffs of these assets, namely that they
are imperfectly correlated with identical means, U. The arbitrageur receives a private signal at
t = 0, informing him that two assets, A1 and A 2, have identical terminal payoffs. We will focus
on equilibrium in the markets for these two assets. For simplicity, we assume that the universe of
assets is sufficiently large that all other investors cannot infer the arbitrageur's information from
prices as the Bayesian probability that a given asset is part of the arbitrageur's signal is always
negligible.
In each market, there are two types of non-strategic investors who place demands: noise traders
and long-term traders. Noise traders buy and sell randomly in each market and are responsible for
the existence of arbitrages. Their trading in A1 and A 2 is XN1 and XN2, respectively. We denote
by F the cumulative distribution of the noise trader spread, AXN -- (XN1 - XN21, and assume
that it has a finite second moment. In this environment, AXN can be seen as a measure of initial
mispricing. Long-term traders submit downward sloping linear demands for each risky asset,
XLR = U - (2.1)
where A > 0. This specification of residual demand curves is standard in the literature (e.g.,
Brunnermeier-Pedersen (2004) and Xiong (2001)). Various interpretations can be given to the
long-term traders. For example, they can be viewed as market makers a la Grossman-Miller (1988)
or uninformed investors fearing exploitation by informed ones (e.g., Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) and
Kyle (1985)).
The main analysis focuses on the behavior of a sequence of short-lived arbitrageurs and a long-
lived bank. Both groups are risk-neutral and strategic. The bank lives forever and has a discount
factor 6.4 Arbitrageurs live for one cycle and place convergence trades on A1 and A2.5 They have
limited wealth and face a default financial constraint of the form,
XA < ML, (2.2)
where XA is the amount of convergence trading undertaken by the arbitrageur. This constraint
captures the arbitrageurs' limited access to initial funding from both investors and banks, the
latter through margin financing. The microeconomic foundations of this type of constraint are well
understood (e.g., Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) and Gromb-Vayanos (2002)).
In each arbitrage opportunity cycle, the arbitrageur observes AXN and can trade without
revealing his strategy to the bank. This choice is denoted by R = 0. The bank does not trade in
this case and prices are determined by market clearing:
P1 = U + A(XN1 - XA) and p2 = U + A(XN2 + XA). (2.3)
Alternatively, the arbitrageur can choose to share his information to the bank in the hope of
negotiating an increase in his trading capacity. This increase can be achieved with an infusion of
4The discount factor needn't only be a proxy for bank impatience. It can also be seen as a proxy for the frequency
of discovering new arbitrages or as a reduced form for relevant elements that aren't modeled here, like bank risk
aversion or agency problems within the bank.
5A convergence trade is defined as a long position in Ai and an equally short position in Aj. In a different setting,
Xiong (2001) also studies equilibrium mispricing under the same assumption that arbitrageurs are restricted to such
trades.
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Figure 2-1: An Arbitrage Opportunity Cycle
capital or, as is more common, a renegotiation of terms in the margin agreement. This choice is
denoted by R = 1. Unfortunately, the bank cannot commit ex-ante to alleviate the arbitrageur's
financial constraint and may select any position limit satisfying M > ML. It can also chose to
front-run the arbitrageur by trading an amount XB > 0 ahead of him. The arbitrageur observes
XB prior to choosing his own position, XA < M and all trades clear simultaneously at the market
clearing price:
pl = +(XN1 -XA -XB) and P2 = + A(XN2 +XA + XB). 6 (2.4)
Profits for the arbitrageur and bank are given by Ap -XA and Ap -XB, respectively,
P1 - P2. See Figure 1 for an illustration of this stage game:
Throughout the statement of our results, we will denote the equilibrium choice of
X by X*.
where Ap -
any variable
6Neither the observability of XB nor the simultaneity of trades are critical to our qualitative results.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Benchmark Equilibria
Prior to determining the equilibria of the game, it is instructive to look at two benchmark out-
comes. The first has no arbitrageurs or banks and is referred to as the last-best equilibrium (LB).
The second case assumes that arbitrageurs have unlimited wealth and face no financial constraints
or, equivalently, that there are no agency problems between the arbitrageurs and the bank. This
benchmark is called the first-best equilibrium (FB).
Proposition 1: In the last-best equilibrium, the price spread is given by:
ApLB = AAXN.
Meanwhile, in the first-best equilibrium, the arbitrageur's demand is given by:
XB = AXN,
while the resulting price spread and profit are equal to:
ApFB = AXN2 and 
IIFB = XN2.8
In the absence of arbitrageurs, the price spread arises because long-term traders absorb AXN
more units of one asset than the other and require an additional premium of A per unit of demand
imbalance. In the first-best case, since the arbitrageur acts strategically, he eliminates only half of
the relative mispricing.
2.3.2 One-Shot Game
We consider subgame perfect equilibria of the one-shot game.
Proposition 2: There is a unique SPE and the arbitrageur's equilibrium strategy is:
lAXN if R = 0 and AXN < 4ML
R* =0 and X = AXN - 1 XB if R = 1 and XB 2 1 AX - 2ML
ML otherwise
while the bank's equilibrium strategy is:
0 if R = 0
M* = ML and X = - AXN if R = 1 and AX N 5 (4 + 2V-)ML
1AXN - ½ML if R = 1 and AXN Ž (4 + 2/v)ML
Since the bank cannot commit to relax the arbitrageur's financial constraint or to not copy his
strategy, it always sets M = ML and XB > 0 following communication. Because the bank has
price impact, this unambiguously makes the arbitrageur worse off and he prefers not to reveal his
information. Arbitrage activity is limited. This also provides more precise foundations for Shleifer-
Vishny's limited arbitrage by identifying an explanation for the separation of brains and capital.
In equilibrium, both parties are worse off. By committing to loosen the arbitrageur's financial
constraint and limit its front-running, the bank could achieve positive profits while still making the
arbitrageur better off.
Prior to analyzing the repeated game, it is useful to determine the profits to the arbitrageur
and the bank in the continuation games from the static case following communication and no com-
munication. The case following communication will determine the bank's profits when optimally
deviating from the relational contract,
J 6AXN2 if AXN < (4 + 2VN)ML
16B = . (2.5)
-AXN2 - AMLAXN + 4ML2 if AXN > (4 + 2v')ML
The case without communication will provide the arbitrageur's outside option:
{AXN2 if AXN < 4ML
A = (2.6)
AMLAXN - 2AML2 if AXN > 4ML
For details, see Lemmas 3 and 4 in the Appendix.
2.3.3 Repeated Game
In the infinitely repeated version of the game, we need to make additional assumptions on the
information that each arbitrageur has about the past behavior of the bank. Specifically, arbitrageurs
know the full history of the bank's behavior. This degree of knowledge could be rationalized if AXN,t
and HA,t became known to the market at t + 1, perhaps because arbitrages only remain private for a
limited time and the arbitrageur's terminal payoff is public information. We could also extend the
model to incorporate imperfectly observable actions in line with Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti (1990)
and Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin (1994). Nevertheless, this would only amplify our limits to arbitrage
problem because the bank would occasionally get away with misbehavior and receive blame when
it behaves.
We also assume that AXN,t is independent and identically distributed over time. The indepen-
dence assumption is reasonable because any predictable component would be known to the entire
market and eliminated through competition. The arbitrageur can only expect to profit on the
surprise component of AXN,t.
Relational contracts are promises the bank makes to the arbitrageur regarding her behavior.
However, these promises cannot be enforced by a court. In a given cycle, promises take the form of
functions Mt' : --+ [ML, oc) and X c , : R -4 [0, 00) that specify the bank's actions as a function
of AXN,t. To conserve on notation, we will suppress the dependence of Mt' and X),, on AXN,t.
Arbitrageurs cannot make any credible promises to the bank because they only live for one cycle.
We consider efficient subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game.
Definition (Efficient Equilibria): An SPE of the repeated game with payoffs (llA,t, 1B,t)
is efficient if and only if there does not exist another SPE of the game with payoffs (I2A,t, HI2B,t)
such that: (i) for every AXN,t, II2 A,t > HiA,t, and (ii) V2t Ž Vlt where Vt is the value of the
relationship to the bank at t:
Vt t Et [ t+JilB,t+j
j=1
We discard SPEs that are not efficient because the bank and the arbitrageur can agree to alter their
component of the relational contract immediately after AXN,t is realized.7 Such an agreement is
possible if the arbitrageur can be made weakly better off, regardless of initial mispricing, while also
improving the bank's continuation payoff. This is essentially an interim Pareto-optimality criterion
(see Brunnermeier (2001)).
In equilibrium, the arbitrageur will only choose R' = 1 if the bank can credibly commit to
satisfy his individual rationality constraint:
HIIA,t(Rt = 1) > IIA,t.
Similarly, the bank's choice of (Mt*, X,t) can be restricted to those specified by the relational
contract, (Mf, XB,t), and the optimal deviation levels, (Mtd, X d ,t ). She chooses to cooperate if and
only if:
BI,, + Vt* - dB,t
where Vt* is the continuation value of the financial relationship to the bank in the particular SPE
at t. Due to the i.i.d. and finite second moment assumptions, this value is bounded. Implicit in the
bank's incentive compatibility constraint is the assumption of maximal punishment by arbitrageurs.
Such punishment is credible if there are other equally qualified banks in the market and there is
no cost to moving the relationship from one bank to another.
Efficient SPEs induce a structure of optimal collusion between the arbitrageur and the bank.
The first element of optimal collusion is illustrated in Lemma 5:
7Presumably, this would not be considered a deviation by future generations of arbitrageurs since it does not
reflect an action that caused a welfare loss to a previous arbitrageur (i.e. it only produces mutually beneficial gains).
Lemma 5: If Rt = 1, then an efficient equilibrium satisfies:
1
XB, t + Mt = 4 AXN,t
and
A,t= Mt
That is, the arbitrageur and the bank optimally collude to achieve first-best total profits.
When communication occurs, the total demand of the arbitrageur and bank equals that of the
first-best equilibrium from Proposition 1. As a result, price spreads are as in the first-best and
profits shared between the arbitrageur and bank are maximized. Put simply, if the arbitrageur and
the bank are going to collude, they will do so effectively.
Plugging XA,t from the lemma into the arbitrageur's profit function yields:
IIA,t(Rt = 1) = 2 AXN,t 4 AXN,t -xB,t )
Along with the arbitrageur's outside option, HA,t, we get an upper bound on the bank's demands:
0
XB , t <- XB,t = AXN,t - 2ML + 4ML2 AXNlt
if AXN,t < 4ML
if AXN,t > 4ML
This bound is intuitive. If the arbitrageur is unconstrained (i.e., AXN,t < 4ML), the bank can-
not place any demands without making him worse off from communicating with her. When the
arbitrageur is constrained, the bank has some freedom to front-run, but only to a limited extent.
Likewise, the bank's IC constraint, along with:
Hct -= A XN,t - X• ,t, (2.7)
implies a lower bound on the bank's demands:
I max {O, AXN,t - 1* (Nt) }ifAXN,t S (4 + 2v)ML
XB,t > xB,t 1
max {0, AXN,t - ML+ if AXN,t _ (4 + 2/v')ML
This lower bound indicates that if the bank's temptation to deviate is high enough, she must be
allowed to trade a certain amount or else she'll choose to deviate.
These two bounds have powerful implications on the possibility of obtaining capital from the
bank. Communication between the arbitrageur and the bank is rational if and only if both the
arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC constraints are satisfied (i.e., XB,t > XB,t). Proposition 6 shows
that this is not always possible.
Proposition 6: Information revelation by the arbitrageur cannot be sustained if AXN,t > JXt
where:
0 if Vt* < AML2
6;4 = 8ML- 4 2ML2 - if AML2 < Vt* < 1+2)AML2
3ML + if VL* 2 AML2
This result is illustrated in Figure 2:
A sketch of the reasoning behind this result can be stated in a straightforward manner. For
large enough mispricing (i.e., AXN,t > (4 + 2 v)ML), the arbitrageur is constrained even when the
bank deviates. Since the bank is unconstrained, she induces a price spread that is half the one that
would obtain if the arbitrageur didn't reveal his information. Therefore, in the event of deviation,
the arbitrageur loses exactly half of the profits he would have earned if he chose R = 0. This loss
is roughly the bank's gain, and since the arbitrageur's outside option is unbounded, its value will
eventually become greater than the bank's reputation value Vt*. In other words, stealing about
HX B,t (Bank's Ie)
x B,t (Arbitrageur's IR)
Commitment is
not sustainable
Figure 2-2: Illustration of Proposition 6
half the arbitrageur's profits can be better than holding on to future business so the bank cannot
commit to improving upon the arbitrageur's outside option. In this case, communication between
the two breaks down and arbitrage is limited like in the one-shot game.
This is the main result of the paper. Financial relationships are limited in their ability to miti-
gate the hold-up problem between arbitrageurs and banks. More importantly, they are insufficient
when mispricing is large so that reputation-based commitment fails when it is needed most for
arbitrage. It is important to note that this result cannot be obtained in a standard repeated game
with !J.XN,t held constant across periods. In fact, performing comparative statics on this alterna-
tive framework is likely to produce the opposite conclusion that arbitrage is limited when !J.XN,t
is small. To see this, look at the bank's incentive compatibility constraint under constant mispricing:
8To simplify exposition, we assume that t:lXN 2:: 4(2 + V2)ML and that the bank keeps all the surplus from its
relationship with the arbitrageur.
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This reduces to:
[1] AXN2 - [A(1 )]MLAXN + [(3 ]ML2 >2 0.8 2 2
Though this IC constraint may be violated, it is guaranteed to hold for sufficiently high values of
AXN.
The main difference between this setting and ours is that allowing AXN to be time-varying
creates a wedge between the bank's deviation profit and the value of financial relationships by
distinguishing between factors that affect current and future mispricing. This ensures that when
current mispricing increases, there is not a corresponding (and amplified) increase in relationship
values. As a result, bank commitment becomes more difficult to sustain in times where AXN,t is
high.
Some front-running is observed in our equilibrium but its degree is always acceptable to the
arbitrageur. Myopically, the bank could do more to hold-up the arbitrageur, but she finds it in her
interests to restrain herself. Furthermore, this degree varies with the attractiveness of the arbitrage.
The arbitrageur needs to allow the bank to behave more opportunistically when these opportunities
are greatest because it is in those events that the temptation to deviate is strongest. In this sense,
we isolate a phenomenon that is broadly consistent with what Abolafia (Ch. 1, 1996) refers to as
"cycles of opportunism" in financial markets.
A second element of optimal collusion that completes our characterization of the efficient equi-
libria:
Lemma 7: An efficient SPE satisfies:
0 if AXN,t < 4ML
R = 1 if 4ML 5 AXN,t < 6x*
0 if AXN,t > 6x*
This result states that the bank's commitment ability is monotonic. If it can make an adequate
commitment at a given level of mispricing, it can also do so at lower levels of mispricing. Lemma
7 also implies that efficient equilibria require the arbitrageur and the bank to collude whenever
possible.
We can summarize the characterization of the equilibria to obtain:
Corollary 8: A strategy profile is an efficient equilibrium if and only if:
(R*, X*,) =
(0, AXNl,t)
(1, Mt*)
if AXN,t • 4ML
if 4ML 5 AXN,t < 6•x*
if AXN,t > 3x'
if AXN,t < 4ML
(IAXN,t - XB,t,XB,t) if 4ML _ AXN,t 5 6x
(ML, 0) if AXN,t 2 6x~
Furthermore, equilibrium price spreads follow immediately from Corollary 8:
Corollary 9: Equilibrium price spreads are given by:
(O, ML)
and
(ML,0)
where XB,t E [XB,t, XB,t]-
(M*, XL,t) =
LAXN,t if AXN,t < 6x2*
Ap = (2.8)
AAXN,t - 2AML if AXN,t > J•XZ
This is illustrated in Figure 3 on the next page. As remarked earlier, whenever there is com-
munication between the arbitrageur and the bank, optimal collusion implies that price spreads are
as in the first-best equilibrium. When the channel for informable finance breaks down though, they
equal those of the one-shot game and arbitrage only has a fixed effect in correcting mispricing.
Figure 3 illustrates the benefits of financial relationships on arbitrage. The thick line denotes the
price spread in efficient SPEs of the repeated game. The shaded region represents the gains from
relationships. This region becomes larger the more valuable a bank's reputation. An interesting
feature of these equilibria is that small differences in initial mispricing, say AXN,t = 6x4 versus
AXN,t = 6x6 + e, can lead to discontinuous changes in equilibrium mispricing. This is because
relationships have their greatest effect in reducing mispricing at AXN,t = x64 and no effect on
price spreads once communication breaks down.
Under fairly general conditions, the limited arbitrage problem becomes worse as the arbi-
trageur's initial wealth increases. To simplify the exposition of this result, we make the weak
assumption that the surplus allocation rule between the arbitrageur and the bank is independent
of ML.9 In line with the literature on Nash bargaining, surplus is given by the difference between
first-best profits and the sum of the arbitrageur's outside option and the bank's net payoff from
deviation:
St IIM,t - [iiA,t +(Bri -Vt) . (2.9)
The above assumption implies that there is a process at that does not depend on ML and satisfies:
,d = b,- Vt) + at S (2.10)
= at - (IIM,t - HA,t) + (1 - at) IId,t- Vt. (2.11)
9If anything, we expect that the arbitrageur's bargaining power relative to the bank would increase with ML. It
can be shown that our results in Proposition 10 continue to hold in this case.
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Figure 2-3: Equilibrium Price Spreads
This result is illustrated in Proposition 10:
Proposition 10: Let 6J (X) denote the value of t* in an equilibrium with ML = X. Assum-
ing that 0 < ML' < MZ" and 6t*(MI) > 0, it follows that 6* (ML) > 6* (MZ).
Higher arbitrageur wealth has two effects. First, the bank gets lower profits following communica-
tion because the arbitrageur's outside option increases. Second, the likelihood that the arbitrageur
is constrained and in need of the bank's services decreases. As a result, the value of financial
relationships falls when ML increases and arbitrage becomes more limited.
2.4 Refinement and Examples
Our characterization of efficient equilibria allows for many different possible outcomes because we
have not made enough assumptions about how surplus is split between the arbitrageur and the
bank.10 In this section, we present a simple refinement of our equilibrium, based on competition
10With the exception of Proposition 10, we've allowed Xc,t to be any curve in the shaded area of Figure 2 (i.e.
anything between XB, t and XB,t).
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between banks in forming relationships with arbitrageurs, that pins down this allocation of surplus
and narrows our set of equilibria down to a unique one.
2.4.1 Simple Refinement
Consider an extension of our stage game that allows banks to make offers of relational contracts
to the arbitrageur after he receives his private signal. Such promises prescribe a contingent action
plan for the bank as a function of AXN,t. This implicitly defines a surplus allocation rule between
the bank and the arbitrageur. We consider two extreme cases of competition between banks. In
the first case, which we refer to as monopoly, the bank is alone in making an offer."1 In the second
case, there are a large number of banks who induce perfect competition in bidding.
In the monopoly case, the bank gets all the surplus from the relationship. As a result, if the
arbitrageur and the bank cooperate, the latter receives the first-best level of profits minus the ar-
bitrageur's outside option. This implies a unique efficient SPE that is characterized by Vt*. This
relationship value is given by the largest solution to the fixed-point problem12:
Vt* IIJ (AXN,t)dF(AXN,t)
where IIB, is defined in Lemma 11 in the Appendix. Existence of the unique solution, Vk, is
guaranteed since zero is always a solution to the equation. Further, Vk is independent of time so
the resulting equilibrium is stationary.
Under perfect competition, the bank promises the arbitrageur as much surplus as she possibly
can. In other words, she either sets X ,t  0 or, when she does trade, binds herself to her IC
constraint by setting:
cPC + V' d
IIB,t + Vt I B,t
"Using the term monopoly here is a bit abusive since we've motivated some earlier results with the assumption
that the arbitrageur can start up new relationships with other equally proficient banks.
12 1t is easy to verify that, if there are two solutions to the fixed-point problem with values Vt* and Vt** > Vt*,
moving from the equilibrium implied by Vt* to V,** is an interim Pareto improvement. Therefore, only the equilibrium
with Vt** is an efficient SPE.
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As in the monopoly case, there is a unique efficient SPE characterized by Vt* which is the largest
solution to the problem:
S16 sXjtPC-
VeC fC c(AXN,t)dF(AXN,t).
where II•PC is defined in Lemma 12 in the Appendix. This produces a solution, V'c, that is also
independent of time.
In both environments, stationarity is driven by the independence assumption on AXN,t and the
fixed surplus allocation rule. It also requires that arbitrageurs be short-lived. This is a different
foundation than found elsewhere in the relational contracting literature. For example, the weak
stationarity lemma in Levin (2003) is driven by the unlimited wealth of the principal and agent
which allows for settling up on a period-by-period basis. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
stationarity of V is not important for the main results of this paper.
Communication is easier to sustain in the monopoly case than the perfect competition case,
since aggressive competition between banks forces them to bid away their share of the surplus and
lowers their valuation of financial relationships. This worsens their ability to make commitments.
Proposition 13 formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 13: Comparing the efficient SPE from the monopoly and perfect competition cases,
we have that:
Vk 2 V;c
and
6X* >Ž 6 *PC.
2.4.2 Binomial Distribution Example
Assume that AXN,t equals e > 0 with probability p and 0 otherwise. Let ML = Pe/4 with / < 1 so
that the arbitrageur is constrained when there is mispricing. The smaller the value of 0, the more
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severely constrained is the arbitrageur when AXN,t = 6.
When the bank has monopoly power, we can solve for the efficient equilibrium by assuming that
information revelation can be sustained at AXN,t = e and checking for consistency afterwards. If
there is communication, we have:
6 8 1-6
We check for consistency by verifying whether the bank's IC constraint is satisfied. It is if:
40+2-2 +1
40 + 3
where 0 = p6/(1 - 6). If the IC constraint doesn't hold, V/ equals zero, since no relational contract
is enforceable.
Notice that 3M is monotonically increasing in 0. This implies that there are no limits to
arbitrage if mispricing is sufficiently frequent or the bank is patient enough. This is intuitive
because both lead to higher relationship values for the bank. What may be surprising is that A
and c do not affect .M. This is due to scaling effects: all profit functions are perfectly linear in A
and quadratic in E, so the arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC constraints are unaffected by these
parameter value. In the case of f, the scaling argument requires us to hold 3 fixed because of the
arbitrageur's outside option.
Likewise, in the case of perfect competition, if communication between the arbitrageur and the
bank occurs at AXN,t = e, we have:
Vc =0 (2.12)
This can be sustained if the arbitrageur's IR constraint holds. That is, if:
S•< Pc =40+2 (2.13)40 + 3
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The same results and intuitions from the monopoly case hold here. Surprisingly, we have that
OPC = OM in this setting. This is a particular feature of the binomial distribution example. When
there is only one level of possible mispricing, competition does not matter at the margin where
arbitrage becomes limited because there is no surplus, beyond the bank's required rent from her IC
constraint, to bargain over. To investigate the effect of competition between banks on the limits to
arbitrage problem requires multiple potential levels of mispricing in order to produce regions where
the division of surplus matters. This motivates our next example.
2.4.3 Normal Distribution Example
We assume that XNl,t and XN2,t are joint normally distributed so that we can write f(AXN,t) =
2 -n(AXN,t; a2) where n(.; o2) is the density of a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
o. We also set 3 = 4ML/a. This parameter can be interpreted as the standard deviation shock to
AXN,t that is required to make the arbitrageur constrained under his default financial constraint.
This is economically similar to the 0 parameter from the binomial distribution case. We also write
(6x*) E 6x*/a. This is the threshold where arbitrage becomes limited normalized by the standard
deviation of mispricing. Holding (6x*) constant fixes the frequency of limited arbitrage in this
setting.
As in the binomial case, the threshold point is invariant to scaling, as shown in the following
Lemma:
Lemma 14: In both the monopoly and perfect competition cases, holding / constant, (6x*) does
not depend on oa and A.
This example cannot be solved in closed form, so we provide numerical solutions. It is useful
to define c = 2 N(-/3) where N(.) is the cumulative distribution for a standard normal. This value
represents the percentage of arbitrage opportunities where the arbitrageur is constrained under
his default financial constraint. Figure 4 illustrates the value of (6x*) as a function of c and the
discount factor 6 in both the monopoly and perfect competition cases.
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Figure 2-4: Relationship Thresholds
Notice that there is a substantial difference in the thresholds between the perfect competition
and monopoly cases. Consistent with Proposition 13, we observe limited arbitrage more frequently
in the case of perfect competition among banks. For instance, as illustrated in the figure, when
6 = 0.85 and the arbitrageur is constrained in 62.5% of the arbitrage opportunity cycles, limited
arbitrage is over 40,000 times more likely in the case of perfect competition (2 -N(-2.88) vs.
2. N(-5.33)). The frequency of limited arbitrage is also economically significant. If the arbitrageur
is sufficiently wealthy (low c), then financial relationships have no value and outcomes are as in
the one-shot game. This is expected since the arbitrageur rarely needs the bank and has a high
outside option, thus producing a low value to reputation that the bank is unable to ever meet the
arbitrageur's outside option.
Perhaps surprisingly, Figure 4 also indicates that a small change in c can have a large and
discontinuous impact on the role that relationships play in funding arbitrage activity. This is due
to the arbitrageur's outside option. As he becomes wealthier, he requires a larger share of profits,
which lowers the value of relationships to the bank. This reduction in value also lowers 6x*, which
further lowers V*. The discontinuity arises, because V* > AM2 is needed to satisfy the bank's IC
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constraint at AXN,t = 4ML.
2.5 Additional Extensions and Discussion
2.5.1 Explicit Contracting
In this section, we consider a special case of explicit contracting, namely the possibility of signing
labor contracts with banks. A labor contract specifies a non-negative and non-decreasing wage
payment that is conditional on profits and possibly a trading budget that sets an upper bound on
the position, M, the bank employee can undertake. However, the content of communication between
the employee and the bank is still non-contractible. Employment contracts can be renegotiated once
an employee joins the bank and the bank maintains her ability to attract employees even if she
deviates from her implicit agreements with arbitrageurs who trade on their own.
There are two types of risk-neutral agents: arbitrageurs, identical to the ones from previous
sections, and speculators. A proportion 0 of potential employees are speculators and the cumulative
distribution function of AXN,t is monotonically increasing. Speculators have no private information
and can only make risky investments that generate mean zero profits with distribution G per unit.
Due to their limited liability constraint, they may extract rents from the bank by risk-shifting.
Speculators also have access to an alternative employment opportunity that pays a fixed wage
Wi > 0. Arbitrageurs' outside opportunity is to trade on their own. For simplicity, we will assume
that the bank is a monopolist and 0 is sufficiently close to 1.13 The latter induces a fly-by-night
constraint where the bank chooses to screen out all speculators. The optimal contract between the
bank and its employees is given in Proposition 15:
Proposition 15: Let Q denote the set of arbitrageur types AXN,t that are hired by the bank.
We have that: (i) the optimal employment contract specifies a finite upper bound M, (ii) Q C
[ML/4, M/4], (iii) the speculators' screening condition binds:
m = ax EG [W(X l I)], (2.14)
X<M
13This assumption is made for expositional reasons and the results continue to hold if 0 E (0, 1).
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(iv) the wage offer is given by:
W(I) =
0 if H < 2AML2
2ML iI - 2AML2 if 2AML2 < H < 2AM 2 and 2 V/ E
(2.15)
supfi<n W(lI) if 2AML2 < H < 2AM 2 and 2 2
4AMLM - 2AML2 if H > 2VM2
and (v) Arbitrage is still limited.
The main parts of this proposition are (i) and (v). Both follow from the fact that the fly-by-
night constraint induces the bank to limit the rents speculators can extract. In order to do this, the
bank cannot leave both the maximal wage and trading budget in its employment offer unbounded.
The upper bound on wages, which is a function of M, follows from the requirement that the con-
tract be renegotiation proof. Unfortunately, these bounds also screen out the arbitrageurs with
the most profitable arbitrage opportunities. Hence, arbitrage activity is still limited. It should be
noted that the form of contract obtained here is similar to those observed in practice. For instance,
proprietary traders employed by investment banks are often subject to position limits and receive
bonuses that depend on their trading profits.
Interestingly, allowing for explicit contracts can increase the frequency of limited arbitrage.
This is due to the fact that, under explicit contracting, the bank has less to lose from deviation
because it keeps its profits from continuing to employ proprietary traders.
Proposition 16: If JSz > 4M > 4ML, then allowing explicit contracts leads to more severe
limits to arbitrage.
The observation that explicit contracts can crowd out implicit ones is also emphasized, in a man-
agerial compensation setting, by Baker-Gibbons-Murphy (1994).
107
2.5.2 Risky Arbitrage
So far, we have assumed that an arbitrage opportunity is riskless. It turns out that risky arbitrage
can only worsen the limits to arbitrage problem because it can lead to the arbitrageur becoming
financially distressed and being forced to liquidate his positions when mispricing worsens. In these
states of the world, the value of financial relationships is lower since the arbitrageur is less likely
to survive. Larger mispricing also increases the bank's temptation to deviate, which amplifies the
decline in relationship value. Therefore, even if the arbitrageur is not currently worried about
expropriation, he might be in the future. This induces both delay in communication and excessive
restraint on the part of the arbitrageur. A thorough analysis of equilibrium in this extended
environment is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5.3 The Market Structure of Arbitrage
In addition to investment banks, several other organizations, like fund-of-funds and seeders, have
emerged in the market for funding arbitrageurs. Fund-of-funds invest in a portfolio of established
hedge funds while seeders help emerging managers obtain initial capital to get up and running.
These investors have significantly more expertise than most investors and usually negotiate favorable
liquidity treatment from the funds they invest in. Therefore, they can play the role of informable
financier for broad strategy at a fund's initiation as well as temporary investment opportunities
that arise during the course of operations.
Furthermore, without their own trading desks, these organizations cannot directly implement
the arbitrageur's strategy. They can only indirectly expropriate by sharing information about the
arbitrageur's profit opportunities with other funds they invest in. This is similar to the hold-up
problem investigated by Cestone-White (2003). Interestingly, consistent with the optimal contract-
ing solution derived to overcome this problem, fund-of-funds and seeders often acquire equity-like
claims in the hedge fund's management company.
The existence of these institutions is consistent with certain implications of our theory. Namely,
that there are benefits to setting up institutions that can serve as informable financiers without hav-
ing a substantial ability to expropriate the arbitrageur. However, it must be noted that investment
banks still provide the bulk of financing to arbitrageurs. There are several potential explanations for
this fact. The industry may still be maturing and facing its own wealth constraints. Alternatively,
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renegotiation of margin agreements and the reallocation of margin use across strategies may be less
costly and time consuming than obtaining additional finance from fund-of-funds and seeders. This
would explain why investment banks are especially dominant as a source of short-term financing.
The industry may also be less effective in understanding and monitoring the arbitrageurs' strategies
because of its lack of direct participation in trading.
Regarding the organizational structure of banks, there is a debate on whether Chinese walls
should be required between prime brokerage and proprietary trading desks. Our model illustrates
one benefit of the absence of Chinese walls, namely that communication between divisions leads to
improved arbitrage when prime brokers lack the expertise to understand the strategies themselves.
However, these walls will be useful whenever the prime broker can understand the arbitrageur
because the expropriation threat is absent when he is prohibited from leaking information to pro-
prietary traders. Therefore, the optimality of enforcing Chinese walls between the two divisions
depends on a trade-off between these factors.
2.5.4 Informable Finance: An Application to the Financing of Innovation
Our model can also be applied to more general settings where informable financiers play a prominent
role in providing capital and intellectual property rights on "ideas" are difficult to enforce. One
setting that seems particularly likely to fit this characterization is the financing of innovation. For
instance, venture capitalists almost always demand access to project details from entrepreneurs
prior to providing capital and, at times, are arguably better judges of project quality than the
entrepreneurs as well. Given the fact that several business plans involve core elements that are
difficult to patent or are "protected" by patents that are easy to circumvent, enforcement issues
are sometimes a concern as well.
Such a setting can easily be mapped into our modeling framework. Specifically, consider the
case where a sequence of entrepreneurs want to fund projects with either bank or venture capital
financing. If project quality is independent and identically distributed, this setting is isomorphic
to our model in sections 2 through 4. In particular, AXN,t now represents a consumer demand
shock (as in Rotemberg-Saloner (1986)) and can be viewed as a measure of project quality. ML
denotes the production capacity that entrepreneurs can achieve while relying only on bank financing
(i.e., non-informable financing). Entrepreneurs can also obtain capital through relationships with
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a venture capitalist (i.e., an informable financier) but must disclose the details of their projects to
obtain this added financing. However, as before, there is a concern in undertaking this disclosure:
in acquiring its expertise, the venture capitalist has jointly acquired the know-how and contacts
required to implement the project herself or through another business partner.
In this environment, our previous analysis indicates that the reputation of the long-lived in-
formable financier alleviates the underinvestment problems that stem from this and other related
hold-up problems. 14 However, reputation is again limited in a specific way: entrepreneurs will be
reluctant to disclose the details of their most profitable projects and, as a result, these projects
will be undercapitalized. The results on explicit contracting from section 5.1 further suggest that
security design alone cannot ameliorate this inefficiency and may, in fact, worsen it.15 ,16
We can also move slightly beyond the model by allowing for the realistic possibility that project
quality exhibits serial correlation. In this setting, it is straightforward to show that the quality
threshold where underinvestment occurs is higher and the degree of underinvestment is lower when
projects have a higher degree of serial correlation. This suggests that the underinvestment problem
may be mitigated during periods of high entrepreneurial activity. Put simply, large innovations will
be most effectively financed in innovation waves (e.g., the peak of the venture capital cycle) because
it is at these times that the informable financier will be most disciplined against expropriating the
entrepreneur.
4 As suggested by the following quote, reputation indeed plays a role in alleviating entrepreneur concerns regarding
conflicts between their interests and those of the venture capitalist (or, as in this case, the corporate venture capitalist):
We are extremely conscious that corporations and entrepreneurial ventures can be in conflict.., if [the
entrepreneurs] don't know us or have never interacted with Cisco, there is an initial concern that needs
to be overcome... We've overcome such concerns by building a track record. We have enough references
within the venture capital community that we can say, 'Hey, why don't you talk to John Doerr or go to
Don Valentine and ask them what they think about having Cisco as an investor.' Pretty unanimously
we get over the hurdle.
- Mike Volpi, Head of Cisco Ventures (in Gupta p.32)
15However, a more complete analysis of how security design impacts the role of informable finance is beyond the
scope of this discussion. In particular, such a treatment should allow for interim uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty after
AXN,t is realized but before final payoff occur) because it allows security design to play an added signalling role
without disclosure.
16In this environment, angel investors may play a similar role to those of fund-of-funds and seeders that was
speculated in section 5.3. Namely, they may be "more informable" than many investors but better able to commit
to not expropriating than venture capitalists (e.g., due to their more limited capital base).
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2.6 Conclusion
We provide an economic foundation for the limits to arbitrage problem, based on a hold-up problem
between arbitrageurs and informable financiers. Reputational concerns on the part of the financiers
partially mitigate this problem. However, relationships fail when needed most. Additionally, more
bargaining power in the hands of arbitrageurs and increased competition among banks can make
everyone worse off since it reduces the value of relationships to the bank. Holding the degree of
bargaining power fixed, we also show that higher initial arbitrageur wealth worsens the effectiveness
of informable finance. Finally, allowing for explicit contracts does not necessarily alleviate the limits
to arbitrage problem and, in fact, can worsen it.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proofs
This section contains the unproven propositions from sections 3 to 5 of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 2: We proceed by backward induction. If R = 0, it follows by assumption that
M* = ML and X* = 0 and from Proposition 1 that X* = min(X'FB, ML). Therefore,
= AXN if
ML if
2AXN - 2
AAXN - 2AML
R = 0 and AXN < 4ML
R = 0 and AXN > 4ML
if R = 0 and AXN • 4ML
if R = 0 and AXN > 4ML
Payoffs are given by:
'AXN29~u.II if R = 0 and AXN • 4ML
AMLAXN - 2AML2 if R = 0 and AXN > 4ML
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and
Now assume that R = 1. Given AXN and XB, the arbitrageur chooses his demand such that:
max AXA (AXN - 2XA - 2XB).
XA<ML
This implies that:
AXN - XB if R = 1 and XB > 1IAXN - 2ML
X*A
ML if R = 1 and XB < 1 AXN - 2ML
As a result, given AXN, the bank's payoff as a function of its own choice of trade is:
-2A (XB - ¼AXN + 'ML) 2+
B(X) = AXN2- AMLAXN + ±ML2 if R = 1 and XB <_ AXN - 2ML
-A (XB - AXN) 2 + IAXN2 if R= 1 andXB> 2 AXN - 2ML
This piecewise quadratic objective consists of two parts. For small values of XB, the arbitrageur is con-
strained while, for higher values of XB, he is unconstrained. The quadratic function corresponding to the
constrained segment reaches its maximum at XB = -AXN - 1ML while the unconstrained version achieves
its maximum at a strictly higher point, namely XB = 1AXN. We now determine the bank's optimal X*
given R = 1 and a particular AXN. To do so, we consider 3 regions of AXN:
Region 1: AXN 5 6ML. We have IAXN - 1 ML >2 AXN - 2ML which implies that there is only
one local/global maximum in the bank's objective function, namely X* = ¼AXN. Notice that this implies
the arbitrageur is unconstrained (i.e. XA < ML).
Region 2: AXN 2 8ML. We have ¼AXN <5 1 AXN - 2ML and, therefore, the only local/global maximum
in the bank's objective is X* = 1AXN - 1ML. The arbitrageur is constrained.
Region 3: 6ML < AXN < 8ML. In this region, there are two local maxima in the bank's objective:
XB = 1AXN (constrained) and XB = 1AXN - -IML (unconstrained). The global maximum is given by
the constrained case if and only if
-AXN2 - -MLAXN + -ML2 > -AXN2,8 2 2 - 16
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or equivalently,
AXN > (4 + 2vf)ML.
Therefore, we have:
{ AXN
1AXLXN- 12
ax,
ML
and
if R = 1 and AXN < (4 + 2vF)ML
11L if R = 1 and AXN Ž (4 + 2vK )ML
if R = 1 and AXN 5 (4 + 2xV)ML
if R = 1 and AXN _ (4 + 20v)ML
Meanwhile, price spreads and arbitrageur profits are given by:
•AXNA {
MMLAXN - AML2
if R = 1 and AXN (4 + 2V2)ML
if R = 1 and AXN > (4 + 2v')ML
if R = 1 and AXN 5 (4 + 2v )ML
if R = 1 and AXN > (4 + 2V2)ML
It is easy to verify that IIH(R = 0) _2 •1*(R = 1) and, hence, R* = 0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 3: If the arbitrageur doesn't reveal his information to the bank, price spreads are given by:
'AXXN
AAXN - 2AML
if AXN < 4ML
if AXN > 4ML
Further, the arbitrageur and bank payoffs are:
8.AXN28 ALAXN
IIn =
AMLAXN - 2AML2
if R = 0 and AXN < 4ML
if R = 0 and AXN > 4ML
and I* = 0.
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Remark for Corollary 3. So long as the arbitrageur is unconstrained, the outcome is as in the first-best
equilibrium. Otherwise, he binds to his default financial constraint and has a fixed convergence effect on the
price spread (reducing it by 2AML).
Corollary 4: If the arbitrageur does reveal his information to the bank, price spreads are given by:
A*AX=
A AXN - AML
if AXN < (4 + 2v2/)ML
if AXN 2 (4 + 2v2)ML
Further, the arbitrageur and bank payoffs are:
TLAXN2
II4 =
I MLAXN - AML2
16AAXN2
II2 = I V'AXN2 - yMLAXN + MA
if R = 0 and AXN < (4 + 2V2)ML
if R = 0 and AXN > (4 + 2v )ML
if R = 0 and AXN 5 (4 + 2V")ML
IL 2 if R = 0 and AXN _ (4 + 2v2)ML
Remark for Corollary 4. When the initial mispricing is small, the arbitrageur is unconstrained following
the bank's aggressive hold-up and the price spread is half that of the first-best equilibrium. Meanwhile,
if AXN,t is large enough, the arbitrageur is still constrained and the price spread equals half that of the
one-shot game. In both cases though, equilibrium mispricing is smaller than in the first-best. This is due
to the fact that the bank is unconstrained and doesn't internalize the arbitrageur's welfare (i.e. a standard
competition effect).
Proof of Lemma 5: First of all, notice that if XB,t > 0, then an unconstrained arbitrageur would choose
XA,t > ¼AXN,t - XB,t since his unwillingness to internalize the effect of his demands on the bank's profits
would lead to total demands that exceed the first-best level. This implies that if the arbitrageur is constrained
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respectively.
and XB,t + Mt = ¼AXN,t, then XA,t = Mt.
We now proceed to prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume there exists an efficient equilibrium such
that Rt = 1 and X*,t + Mt # "AXN,t for some AXN,t. It follows that II* t +  < AXNt Consider an
alternative set of strategies identical to this one with the exception that, at the aforementioned AXN,t, we
SXt= and Mt** = XN, - X**. This implies that HI** + = * AXNt > 1I," + ±`I,
have X**% B A Xp
or equivalently, since BI* = H*,, that H,t > 1 ,t. Notice that since the initial equilibrium satisfied both
the arbitrageur's IR constraint and the bank's IC constraint, so does the new one (the IC constraint still
holds since the value of the relationship Vt** in the new construction is equal to the V,* from the initial
equilibrium). This contradicts the claim that the SPE is efficient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We consider three different regions for relationship values: (i) Vt* < AML2, (ii)
AML2 < Vt* < (1 + 2v2)AML2/2, and (iii) Vt* Ž (1 + 2V')AML2/2.
First Region: If Vt* < AML2, it is impossible to satisfy both the arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC
constraints at AXN,t = 4ML. As a result, no communication can ever be sustained between the two and
6X* = 0.
Second Region: In this case, the breakdown of communication happens before AXN,t = (4 + 24V)ML and
6x* solves:
-6x - 2ML+4ML2 (x) = 6  - -~- (x ) (2.16)
Third Region: When V,* > (1 + 2V/)AML2/2, the breakdown occurs after AXN,t = (4 + 24i2)ML and
6x* solves:
6xf - 2ML + 4ML2 ) = 6x - ML + (ML - -) (* ). (2.17)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: We split this proof into two components: (i) show that R~' = 1 for AXN,t = 6x•,
and (ii) show that if Rf = 1 for AXN.t and 4ML 5 AXN,t _ AXN,t, then R* = 1 for AX',t. Both are
proven by contradiction.
First Component: Suppose there exists a Pareto-optimal equilibrium where Rt = 0 for AXN,t = 6xf.
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Consider a strategy profile that is identical to this equilibrium with the exception that it differs at the point
AXN,t = 6x. At that point, set X'B = 2(m,t-HA,t) and M' = . It is easy to check that both the
arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC constraints are met for AXN,t = 64x and for all AXN,t where R* = 1.
Therefore, the new strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the aforementioned one.
Contradiction.
Second Component: Assume that there exists a Pareto-optimal equilibrium where R* = 1 for AXN,t
and Rf = 0 for AXNt. Since R* = 1, we have Xt > Xt for AXN,t. It follows that Xt > X' for AXJ,t
as well. Pick any XB E [E , Xt] and consider a strategy profile that is identical to the stated equilibrium
except that it sets R' = 1 and XB,t = XB (while satisfying Lemma 5) for AX',t. It is easily verified that
both the arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC constraints are satisfied for AX',t and for all AXN,t where
RF = 1. This new strategy profile is subgame perfect and Pareto-dominates the aforementioned equilibrium.
Contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: We proceed to prove this by contradiction. Assume there exists two equilib-
ria with ML < MZ such that 6*(ML) < 6;(MZ). From Proposition 6, 6f(ML) < 6(Mf') implies that
VY*(ML') < Vt*(MZ). Therefore, the bargaining power assumption implies that 11,(ML) > l, (ML') in
the interval 4ML ! AXN,t : 6xS'(ML). Now consider an alternative relational contract for ML with:
IIt" (ML) if AXN,t < 6* (ML)
IB,** (ML) (2.18)
1II't(MY ) if AXN,t > 6f(ML)
It follows that Vt** (Mi) > Vt*(MZ) and the bank's IC constraint is strictly satisfied up until 6t*(ML). Given
optimal collusion, the arbitrageur's IR constraint is also met up till 6* (M") since his outside option is strictly
lower when ML = ML' than when ML = M. Continuity of Idt and the strict satisfaction of the bank's IC
under nc'**/ML) implies that there exists an E > 0 such that we can construct a relational contract with:
Ict (ML) if AXN,t • Vt (ML)
I,* t(MI) if 6*(ML) < AXN,t 5 6f(M")
IIC,***(m)l =_ (2.19)
maxaxN,, IHBt(ML) if 6f (M) < AXN,t < 6f*(MI) + E
0 if AXN,t > 6t (ML) +E
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This contract satisfies 6x** (ML) > xt*(MZ) and contradicts the statement that the equilibrium with
6x*(ML') is efficient. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11: A monopolist bank's cooperation profit, as a function of Vt*, is given by:
0 if AXN,t < 4ML
IT M = AX,2 - AMLAXN,t + 2AML2 if 4ML 5 AXN,t 5 64x
0 if AXN,t > 64X
where 6x4 depends on Vt* as described in Proposition 6.
Proof of Lemma 11: When V,* -< Fdlt and AXN,t < 6x t , the bank cannot commit to give the arbi-
trageur all the surplus, but can commit to cooperation. In this case, II = id *. We apply this logicB,t Bt - Vt*" e apply t i  l i
to different regions that span all possible values of Vt*.
Region 1: Vt* < AML2. There is no communication between the two parties and fc'PC is always zero.
Region 2: AML2 < Vt* 1+22) AML2. In this region, the bank cannot commit not to trade start-
ing at AXN,t = 4V*/A i 4ML. Meanwhile, since 64x < (4 + 2ýV)ML so the bank's profit given that
AXN,t is between 4V/t*/A and 6Sf is AX2,t - V,*. Otherwise it is 0.
Region 3: ( 1+22- AML2 < Vt* < (3+2) AML2. This is similar to region 2, with the exception
that 6x >_ (4 + 2v/)ML, so the bank's profit given that AXN,t is between (4 + 2V/)ML and 64• is
AAX t - MLAXN,t + AML2 - Vt*.
Region 4: Vt* > (3+2)AML2. Similar to region 3 but the point where the bank starts trading is
now above (4 + 2VI)ML and equals 2ML + 2 2ML2 + 2v*. Therefore, whenever the bank makes positive
profits, it makes AXN,- MAXN, + ML2 - V1*. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12: The bank's cooperation profits, as a function of Vt*, are given by:
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Region 1: Vt* < AML2.
,PC = 0B,t 0
Region 2: AML2 < Vt* < (1+2 ) AML2.
0OP
rI c P C  A X2
B,t -6 XN,t - t*
0
if AXN,t < 4 rý.VA
if 4 t AXN,t < 8ML-4 2ML2-+ -
if AXN,t Ž 8ML - 4V2ML2 -
Region 3: (l+ )AML2 < Vt * (3+22 /) AML2.
if AXN,t < 4 rf_V-IA
AXkN,t - V*
AXNX -ML AXN,t + -ML2 - Vt*N t 2 l~u-v
if 4 • AXN,t 5 (4 + 2v)ML
if (4 + 2x/2)ML < AXN,t <
3ML + 2(
if AXN,t > 3ML + (-IM)
Region 4: V* > (3+2 ) AML2.
0
AX 2- MLAXN,t + ML2 - V*
SU
if AXN,t 5 2ML + 2 2ML2 +
if 2ML + 2 2ML2 + <
AXN,t • 3ML + 21* (~
if AXN,t Ž 3ML + 2* ()
Proof of Lemma 12: The proof follows immediately from Corollary 4 given the fact that: (i) no rela-
tionship is sustained if Vt* 5 AML2, (ii) the bank starts front-running and the relationship breaks down
prior to AXN,t = (4 + 2v'2)ML if AML2 < Vt* < (1 + 2v')AML2/2, (iii) the bank starts front-running
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Hc,PCB,t
ic,PCB,t
r
prior to (4 + 2v'/)ML and the relationship breaks down after (4 + 2V2)ML when (1 + 2V')AML2/2 <
Vt* < (3 + 2V')AML2/2, and (iv) the bank starts front-running and the relationship breaks down after
(4 + 2v')ML when Vt* > (3 + 2v/2)AML2/2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 13: We proceed in a similar fashion to the proof of Proposition 10. Assume that
Vk < Vke and that profits in both cases are given by (1*l,M
, 
H*B,M) and (I*A,Pc
, 
l*,pc ). Consider the
relational contract with:
BB,M
B, P
Bl,Pc
if AXN,t 6x*M
if AXN,t > x*Xpc
(2.20)
As in Proposition 10, this profit function assures that both the arbitrageur's IR and the bank's IC constraints
are met (the latter strictly). Therefore, there exists an c > 0 such that the relational contract with bank
profits given by:
IB,M
B,M HM - IA
0
if AXN,t 5 6x*M
if Sx*M 5 AXNt <5 6X*p + E
if AXN,t 65XPc + C
that is self-enforcing and satisfies the surplus allocation rule in the monopoly setting. Since the breakdown in
communication in this equilibrium is 6x*pc + E, we have contradicted the statement that the initial monopoly
equilibrium was efficient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 14: We explicitly prove the claim for the monopoly case where Vk > (1 +
The relationship value in this case is determined by the fixed point problem:
6 340+ L - -- x + eA02a2 1 2V = -13 ' [2A - Vxp + - exp2 dx.1 - 6 0 8 4 8 0 2 a4
2/v')AML2/2.
(2.22)
We can divide by Au2 on both sides of this equation and rewrite it as:
3 li _ 0' 0v VýV1 2 - 1 2 -+exp ý2 d&.8 4 8 4r 2 (2.23)
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(2.21)
where 1 = x/a and V = V/Aa2. It immediately follows that (6x*) = 30/4 + 8V/O3 is a constant since V is
the value of financial relationships when A = a = 1. The same procedure can be used to prove that (6x*) is
constant in the other cases since the bank's profit function is always quadratic in AXN,t. Q.E.D.
Remark on Lemma 14: The irrelevance of A does not depend on the distribution of AXN,t. Likewise, the
statement regarding a will hold for any distribution whose pdf can be written in the form f(x; a) = g(x/a)/a.
Many additional distributions have this property (e.g. exponential distribution).
Proof of Proposition 15: Assume the bank decides to set her employment offer to attract an arbitrageur of
type AXN,t = x. She will set his (targeted) wage offer at W = IHA(x) since she has monopoly power and
minimizing W will also maximize her ability to screen out speculators. Translating into an expression of
wage as a function of profit, by using [I = 1IM = •x2/8, yields W(H) = 2MLvr2 - 2AML2. The constraint
that the wage function be non-decreasing implies that W(1) = supfi<n W(IfI) for all II Q .
We now proceed to prove the remainder of the.proposition in four parts: (i) We show that arbitrators
with opportunity AXN,t < 4ML are not hired by the bank, (ii) that M is bounded, (iii) that W =
maxx<H EG[W(X • ~I)], and (iv) that the wage offer is capped at W = 4AMLM - 2AML2.
First Part: The bank chooses to screen out arbitrators of type AXN,t • 4ML because they are un-
constrained and their outside option satisfies [IA = 11M. As a result, hiring these types would not provide
additional profits to the bank and would also act to tighten the screening condition for the speculators (since
they would benefit from the wage component that attracts the these arbitrators. Therefore, W(II) = 0 for
l < 2AML2.
Second Part: Assume that M is unbounded. If W(.) is unbounded as well, then it is impossible to
screen speculators. Meanwhile, if W(.) is bounded, arbitrators with opportunities AXN,t greater than a
threshold, 6•, will choose not reject the employment offer since [A is unbounded. This implies that no
arbitrageur employed by the bank will ever choose to trade more than 6x/4 units. Hence, it is unnecessary
to leave M unbounded. Contradiction.
Third Part: If F < maxx<VEG[W(X flI)], then speculators are not screened and the bank is better
off not hiring anyone. Meanwhile, if W > maxe<-g EG[W(X -II)], the bank can hire additional arbitrators,
with types just beyond 6^x, at a profit without violating the speculators screening condition. 17
17If the cumulative distribution function of F were not strictly monotonic, we wouldn't be able to rule out the
possibility that U > maxx<u EG[W(X - lI)].
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Fourth Part: The arbitrageur's outside option at AXN,t = M/4 is equal to 4AMLM - 2AML2. As a
result, if W > 4AMLM - 2AML2, arbitrageurs of type greater than M/4 will choose to be employed by the
bank. However, since the bank screens out speculators, these arbitrageurs could renegotiate their employ-
ment agreement with the bank after they join the firm. The bank would be willing to renegotiate because
only arbitrageurs with AXN,t > M/4 would attempt to do so. Understanding this, speculators would recog-
nize that their screening condition fails if they attempt to renegotiate and would choose to accept the bank's
employment offer. In order for the contract to be renegotiation proof, the marginal arbitrageur who accepts
to work for the bank must be of type AXN,t = M/4 which implies that W = 4AMLM - 2AML2. Q.E.D.
Remark on Proposition 15: Not all arbitrageurs of type above ML/4 and below M/4 will choose to work for
the bank.
Proof of Proposition 16: If 6*• > 4M, explicit contracting alone does not lead to more effective arbi-
trage activity than the purely relational environment. Furthermore, since the bank keeps her profits from
explicit contracting when she deviates on implicit promises, her IC constraint becomes:
B,t + V- HB,t + Vj (2.24)
where Vý > 0 is the bank's discounted future profits from explicit contracting with arbitrageurs. In this
case, the bank's XB,t is strictly higher than before and breakdown occurs earlier for a given V*. This implies
that V* is lower than in the relational environment and the limits to arbitrage problem is worsened. Q.E.D.
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